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The best thing for being sad... is to learn something. That is the only thing that never 
fails. You may grow old and trembling in your anatomies, you may lie awake at night 
listening to the disorder of your veins, you may miss your only love, you may see the 
world about you devastated by evil lunatics, or know your honour trampled in the 
sewers of baser minds. There is only one thing for it then – to learn. Learn why the 
world wags and what wags it. That is the only thing which the mind can never 
exhaust, never alienate, never be tortured by, never fear or distrust, and never dream 
of regretting. Learning is the thing for you. Look at what a lot of things there are to 
learn—pure science, the only purity there is. You can learn astronomy in a lifetime, 
natural history in three, literature in six. And then, after you have exhausted a million 
lifetimes in biology and medicine and theocriticism and geography and history and 
economics – why, you can start to make a cartwheel out of the appropriate wood, or 
spend fifty years learning to begin to learn to beat your adversary at fencing. After 
that you can start again on mathematics, until it is time to learn to plough. 
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Summary 
Much of the world relies heavily on apps. Increasingly those apps handle sensitive 
information: controlling our financial transactions, enabling our personal communication 
and holding intimate details of our lives. So the security of those apps is becoming 
increasingly vital. Yet research shows that those apps contain frequent security and 
privacy problems; and that almost all of these issues could have been avoided had the 
developers had sufficient motivation, support and knowledge. This lack of developer 
knowledge and support is widely perceived as a major threat. 
We therefore investigated the skills, approach and motivation required for developers. We 
conducted a Constructivist Grounded Theory study, involving face-to-face interviews 
with a dozen experts whose cumulative experience totalled over 100 years of secure app 
development, to develop theory on secure development techniques. The study identified 
that the subdiscipline of app development security is still at an early stage, and found 
surprising discrepancies between current industry understanding and the experts’ 
recommendations. In particular it found that a secure development process tends not to 
appeal to app developers; and that the approach of identifying common types of security 
problems is too limited to give an effective security solution. 
Instead we identified a set of successful techniques we call ‘Dialectical Security’, where 
‘dialectic’ means learning by questioning. These techniques use dialogue with a range of 
counterparties to achieve app security in an effective and economical way. The security 
increase comes from continued dialog, not passive learning. 
The novel contribution of our work is to provide: 
 A grounded theory of secure app development that challenges conventional 
processes and checklists, and 
 A shift in perspective from process to dialectic. 
Only by working to develop the Dialectical Security skills of app developers shall we 
begin to see the kinds of secure apps we need to combat crime and privacy invasions. 
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1 Introduction 
The past ten years has seen a massive growth in the creation and usage of mobile phone 
and tablet apps. We use apps to communicate, apps to plan, apps to manage our finances, 
apps to do our shopping, and apps to remember all our security information. Increasingly 
those apps are handling sensitive information about us: controlling our financial 
transactions, enabling our personal communication and social networking and holding the 
intimate details of our lives. So the security of those apps is becoming increasingly vital.  
Creating our apps are more than 2.9 million app developers, of whom only some 25% are 
professionals developing apps for companies [106]. In these apps, cloud-based 
connectivity and social networking functionality are making security and privacy issues 
fundamentally important. So security expertise – and hence effective security practices – 
in those developing such apps is vital. 
Yet there is considerable evidence that such expertise is lacking. Analysis of the top five 
payment apps by Bluebox [18], a security solution provider, found significant security 
failures in each; analysis of a range of Android apps by Enck et al. [39] found privacy 
problems in most of them. Both analyses highlighted that it was the choices that the app 
programmers had made that were causing the problems; given the same environment and 
cloud services they could have chosen problem-free implementations. 
Indeed a recent IBM-driven survey of opinions about app security in American 
companies [84] revealed that more than 70% percent believed that the developer 
inexperience was a major threat to their business. 
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Thus the security of users and data depends vitally on programmers’ security practices. 
Therefore, it is important to improve the effectiveness of developers at producing secure 
apps. We can choose from three possible research questions to address this, all 
worthwhile:  
(1) What kinds of security errors do programmers make?  
(2) How do we improve the systems and compilers that support the developers in 
their work; and  
(3) How can we improve the security skills of the app developers themselves?  
There has been a good deal of work on the first question such as the previously-
mentioned work by Enck and Bluebox, or work by Xie et al. [112] exploring the reasons 
why programmers make security errors. Various projects – including Xie et al.’s IDE 
enhancements [111], compiler improvements and libFuzzer’s testing support [66] – 
address the second question. Taking the third question, however, there is little 
understanding how and why app programmers learn security and what approaches are 
likely to work best.  
This work examines that third question. In the remainder of this chapter we shall explore 
briefly the state-of-the-art, derive research questions and briefly discuss the approach 
used, highlight novel aspects of the work and its results, and finally outline the remainder 
of the thesis.   
1.1 State of the Art and Its Limitations 
The study of app programmer education and empowerment involves research on  
1. how programmers actually learn,  
2. how they can be helped to learn, and  
3. what they should learn. 
Taking each of these aspects of research, there is a small amount of relevant work on how 
app developers learn security. Balebako et al. [10] surveyed and interviewed over 200 app 
developers, and concluded most approached security issues using web search, or by 
consulting peers. A survey by Acar et al. concluded the same; and they also determined 
experimentally the surprising result that programmers using digital books achieved better 
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security than those using web search [2].  Yskout et al. [116] tested experimentally the 
effect of using security patterns in server design; the results suggested a benefit but were 
statistically inconclusive. 
Considering how programmers can be helped to learn, two projects, Xie et al. [111] and 
Nguyen et al. [77], have both developed prototype IDE-based tools to teach programmers 
by detecting possible security flaws in Android developments. One might expect, 
however, that the most effective approach would be a prescriptive set of instructions to 
programmers what to do, a ‘Secure Development Lifecycle’ such as those promoted by 
Microsoft [69] and others. However Conradi and Dyba [26] identified that programmers 
have difficulty with, and resist learning from, formal written routines. This conforms to 
the author’s own experience; he has never encountered an app development team 
voluntarily adopting a process of that kind. That suggests that app developers need to find 
a more lightweight, less prescriptive approach. 
Considering what programmers need to learn, there is a good deal of general knowledge 
available on software security, such as books by Anderson, by Pfleeger and by Schneier 
[7,82,93] though these work at a level that is rarely helpful for app developers.  
Knowledge useful to developers derives from a variety of sources. There is the security 
patterns movement [71], which showed promise but has not been widely adopted [115]; 
there are books written by software security practitioners (e.g. [55,68]), which tend to be 
helpful but are rarely adopted by app programmers – possibly for the reasons identified 
by Conradi and Dyba above. Then there are ‘black hat’ books, such as the ‘Android 
Hacker’s Handbook’ [35], describing possible attacks and sometimes suitable mitigations 
for programmers to put against them.  These seem to sell well, but work only at a 
technical level; they do not address the kind of security or privacy issues that derive from 
the app domain rather than the technicalities of app programming.   
Lastly there are web question-and-answer sites and operating system specific websites 
and books on app security, which are consulted by developers but suffer from the same 
problem – as well as, in the case of the question-and-answer sites, doubtful accuracy [2]. 
Consistent in all this literature, whether the patterns books, the security practitioners, the 
black hat literature or websites, is an emphasis on artefacts; for them processes are ways 
to deliver those artefacts. Thus all talk in terms of documents (assessments, architectures, 
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plans) and aspects of system design. Each source leaves the development team to make 
their own decisions how to achieve those artefacts; there has been little research into how 
the teams might do this. Moreover whilst ‘whole system security’ experts such as 
Anderson [7] are excellent at driving a holistic, rather than purely technical, view of 
software security, they rarely consider the team interactions needed to achieve the results 
they need. 
Chapter 3 explores the literature on programmer learning in more detail; chapter 4 
discusses learning resources available to programmers. 
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
Our research model assumes a self-motivated development team of one or more 
developers who are empowered to make their own decisions on development process, 
tools and philosophy. In our experience this model reflects common practice in all but the 
most disciplined corporate and organisational cultures. The impact of making their own 
decisions is important; it means that techniques which are successful but unattractive or 
demotivating for developers are unlikely to be of value, since they will not be adopted. 
We are also interested only in individuals and teams working on software that does have 
security and privacy implications. Clearly a team creating a stand-alone game with no 
external communication will not need to worry about security; so we do not need to 
convert the entire developer world into security fanatics. However as the research above 
highlights, many more apps have security – and especially privacy – implications than 
developers may be aware of, and there is a need to consider how to encourage developers 
to address these. 
The research question of this thesis is therefore: 
RQ1 What techniques and ideas will appeal to development teams and lead to them 
developing more secure app software? 
Our purpose in the research was to generate knowledge about good ways to develop apps 
securely. We started the research with no preconceptions as to whether we were looking 
for a single solution or diverse suite of solutions. Our research approach was driven by 
two perceptions: 
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 We had found few resources indicating how to tackle app development security.   
 Existing literature tended to be negative in approach, listing things the developer must 
not do; this contrasts with the kinds of books preferred by developers which tend to 
be positive in outlook. 
Since we had no initial theory to test, we considered an experimental approach to be 
unsuitable. For the same reason we ruled out surveys to test hypotheses. Instead we 
wanted to generate theory, based on an exploration of a range expert knowledge of 
existing practice. We therefore chose a Grounded Theory (GT) approach [21,47], since 
GT has been used extensively for that purpose in Software Engineering research [100].  
Our major resource was personal connections and links to industry specialists in app 
development, including in secure app development. Thus our Grounded Theory study 
used semi-structured interviews over 6 months with a dozen such experts, whose 
cumulative experience totalled more than 100 years of secure app development. To 
encourage positivity, we used elements of Appreciative Inquiry [27] in our questioning: 
the ‘Discovery’ of best practice and the ‘Dream’ of ideal practice.  
The original research question leads to a number of further questions: 
RQ2 What motivated the experts themselves to learn software security; how did they 
do so; and how do they continue to learn?  
RQ3 What are the most effective techniques to deliver app security? 
RQ4 How should we effectively introduce security to app development teams? 
These further questions motivate the different questions used in the survey, as discussed 
in section 2.12. 
1.3 Novel Contributions 
From our research we show in chapter 5 that there is little similarity in people’s 
motivation to learn software security, nor consensus on how to motivate app developers 
to do so. We also find diverging opinions on the use of teamwork and on the best 
approach to implementing security. From these findings, by comparison with the history 
of other paradigms, we suggest in section 5.7 that the subdiscipline of app development 
security is at an early stage of development. 
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Furthermore, we show in chapter 6 that developers need to have a wider view of app 
security than merely code-level technical issues, and in section 6.1 that the experts’ 
recommendation is to use ‘dialectic’ techniques, seeking out and responding to challenges 
from a variety of counterparties. We identify six such techniques of ‘Dialectical 
Security’, and explore each in some detail in chapter 7.  
Finally, in chapter 8, we offer a range of original ‘interventions’ capable of teaching such 
techniques even to such a disparate group as solo app developers, and offer possible 
research programs to investigate both the techniques of Dialectical Security and the 
interventions in more detail. 
1.4 Conventions in this Thesis 
This thesis covers aspects of best practice for app development teams on both security 
and privacy. To save cumbersomeness in the text, we have referred throughout to ‘app 
security’ to cover both these aspects; where there is a distinction, we make it plain which 
to which we are referring. Similarly a decision in the context of the wider goal for the 
software might be a ‘commercial decision’ for a profitmaking company, or a ‘political 
decision’ for a development team in a government department; for convenience this thesis 
refers to both as a ‘commercial decision’. 
This thesis follows the convention of many academic papers in using ‘we’ to refer to the 
author working in conjunction with both supervisors; the thesis refers to Charles Weir the 
individual in the third person, as ‘the author’.  
1.5 Thesis Overview 
The following chapters in this work describe the results of the Grounded Theory study. 
They explore existing work on the subject; analyse surveys with a dozen experts of 
different types in the app security field; highlight the differences between approaches 
from different experts; discuss the range of different resources; synthesises six important 
techniques for developers to learn; and conclude with suggestions of further work 
considering how they might best be taught. Specifically, the chapters are as follows: 
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Chapter 2 introduces the Grounded Theory research method used, explaining the 
philosophy used, how the interviewees were chosen, what type of people they were and 
how the results were analysed. 
Chapter 3 explores existing research literature addressing programmer education and app 
security. 
Chapter 4 extends the literature review to cover resources available to programmers to 
learn about app software security. 
Chapter 5 analyses our findings from our interviews, exploring the differences amongst 
interviewees on motivation and approach. 
Chapter 6 explores the best techniques for app security, highlighting the ‘Dialectical’ 
nature of good app security; and introduces three personas representing different kinds of 
app developer. 
Chapter 7 discussing six specific techniques of Dialectical Security, illustrated with 
specific examples using the personas, and including detail from the interviews. 
Chapter 8 explores possible ways to extend this work, with a vision on approaches to 
improve the security behaviour of app programmers generally. 
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2 Research Process 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the methods used in the research process. It introduces the author 
and aims, and outlines the two foundations to the research: Grounded Theory and 
Appreciative Inquiry. It also describes the interview process, the interviewees, and the 
two forms of information derived from them. 
2.2 Research Philosophy  
A good starting point is to define the philosophical approach we have as researchers. 
Creswell [30] describes four major philosophical stances depending on the aims and 
needs of the researcher.  Briefly these are positivist, looking for a single objective truth; 
relativist, rejecting the idea that a single objective truth exists, and looking for a more 
local truth; action-based, aiming for change as a direct result of the research; and 
pragmatic, looking for specific social or business benefits as a result of the research.  
For the author, the purpose of this research is to provide tools to help with software 
development; his experience with software developers led to a wish to find better ways of 
doing that job. Therefore, our approach to this research is strictly pragmatic. In particular 
this means that we use aspects of different methodological approaches as seems likely to 
get the most effective results. As discussed in section 1.2, our two key research 
approaches for this work are Grounded Theory and Appreciative Inquiry. The following 
sections introduce them in more detail. 
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2.3 Introduction to Grounded Theory  
Grounded Theory (GT) is a systematic methodology to construct theory through the 
analysis of data. It originally developed in the US medical field, where the direct value of 
discoveries about human social behaviour is high. Glaser’s early works, ‘The Discovery 
of Grounded Theory’ and ‘Theoretical Sensitivity’ [47,48] contain a good deal of 
discussion of the social benefits of the process, and a polemical style against alternatives.   
Within 10 years Glaser and Strauss/Corbin [101] were competing for ‘ownership’ of the 
technique and the two resulting ‘flavours’ of GT still remain distinct. Both approaches are 
positivist in essence, though Glaser’s aim is to `discover' a single overarching theory, 
while Strauss is more interested in causes and effects [75]. 
 Later still, as the technique was adopted by European researchers, Charmaz [21] tailored 
it to support the relativist philosophy [79]. The resulting variant is now known as 
Constructivist GT, an approach that emphasises the researcher’s impact and the restricted 
applicability of any results. In accordance with our pragmatic philosophy, the approach 
used in this research is Constructivist GT. 
Glaser and Strauss/Corbin’s works are strong on justifications and in some cases team 
approaches, but less so on practical instructions how to go about making detailed choices 
in following the method [45]. However software engineering researchers now have access 
to a range of work filling this gap. A good starting point is Hoda et al.’s set of patterns 
instructing a novice how to set about a GT research project [54]. Other work in this area 
extends basic GT with detailed advice, such as Adolph's ‘Lessons Learned’ [3] and 
Allan's ‘Critique of Using Grounded Theory’ [6]. Finally Stol et al.’s ‘Grounded Theory 
in Software Engineering Research’ [100] provides a detailed and very explicit set of 
instructions on how to achieve academic rigour. 
2.4 A Brief Overview of Grounded Theory  
Traditional science assumes that theories are generated as hypotheses by the researcher, 
which are then repeatedly tested against reality [83]. The concept is that random theories 
are winnowed by the scientific process to leave only those which match observable and 
testable fact. Grounded Theory attempts to make theory generation into a more 
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dependable process, based on textual analysis. Rigorous testing of the theories generated 
is expected to happen via other approaches.  
The textual analysis is of everything relevant that is available to the researcher. Thus it 
might include interview transcripts, survey comments, relevant research literature, field 
notes from observation and anything else that can be reduced to text form. This is 
summed up in the GT principle all is data. 
The process is iterative, with analysis of initial findings from interviews or similar 
typically leading to changes in the research thrust and direction, and with every code 
written being matched against all the others, a technique called the constant comparative 
method.  
2.5 Grounded Theory Step-by-Step  
Figure 1 shows the techniques that we use in the Grounded Theory process. 

























Figure 1: Grounded Theory process 
Table 1 describes each technique in more detail, as follows: 
Table 1: The steps in Grounded Theory 
Technique Description 
Open coding We scan each text line-by-line, highlighting points of interest. 
We then ‘code’ each to represent specific concepts. We chose the 
codes to be similar across documents, so that a given code 
represents the same concept throughout the research.  
Memoing As we do that, naturally, ideas will occur to us and thoughts 
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about how the terms may be interrelated. We write these in 
separate texts called memos. 
In doing this, we are open to new ideas and concepts that may 
change and affect our future gathering of data. For example, if 
we see concepts emerging, we may explore these in more detail 
in future interviews. 
Categorisation Gradually, as we assign codes, we will naturally see them appear 




 In traditional Glassarian research, the aim is to find a single 
overarching Core Category: the one which covers the most 
interesting features in the data. Researchers are encouraged to 
look for categories that cover as much of the variation in the data 
as possible. 
However in this research, we are looking for not one category, 
but a number of concepts which can be identified and named 
separately; we use the validity criteria for a Core Category to 




The data gathering is considered complete when further data 
received does not lead to significant new concepts. This is 
termed ‘theoretical saturation’. 
Theory generation In building a theory, we are looking for relations between 
concepts and categories that explain the relations between 
concepts and categories. 
 Sorting To provide a coherent output, we need a narrative. Strauss in 
particular talks a good deal about the literary aspects of the 
narrative, in particular ‘grab’, the relevance to the reader [4]. The 
sorting process is arranging the codes, memos and categories in 
such a way as to produce a convincing narrative.  
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Write-up Here we write up the narrative as a coherent report. We use 
extensive anonymised quotations from the data sources to 
provide rigour, and use illustrations and where appropriate to 
convey the information clearly. 
2.6 The Use of Literature Surveys 
Hoda et al. [54] recommends using existing literature in a different way from other forms 
of research.  Grounded Theory has a major concern about being biased by existing 
thinking. So GT’s original recommendation was to leave any literature survey until after 
the main bulk of coding and ideas generation [3]. Hoda et al. disagree with this, pointing 
out that literature surveys are often needed due to academic pressures and the need for the 
researcher to be up to speed with the subject terminology. They therefore recommend a 
short literature survey to begin with, and a longer one once the majority of data has been 
coded. The longer survey may itself contribute to the coding and memo generation. 
However we have not seen a suggestion that written papers are coded with the same level 
of detail that is given to other research data.  
Others suggest a similar approach: Allan [6] used a literature survey in advance of GT 
work to identify if there were compelling theories already in existence.  
We have therefore taken the approach of an initial literature survey to learn nomenclature 
and avoid ` reinventing the wheel'. A final, post-research survey added further detail in the 
context of the discoveries from our interviews. In writing the thesis, we combined the 
results of both surveys in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.7 Incorporating Appreciative Inquiry 
A further important question is how to structure the interviews to get the most helpful 
results. Our major concern in discussing security with experts was the danger of a litany 
of complaints and major problems they had seen. Much security literature, especially of 
the ‘black hat’ variety, amounts to this. We wanted instead to avoid the details of 
problems, and to focus on what had actually worked well for our interviewees.  
This led us to look at Appreciative Inquiry. This method is primarily used as an Active 
Research method, with its purpose to change the participants’ behaviour for the better as 
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they reflect on their answers to questions. In this research we did not need to change the 
participants (though we believe the reflection involved with answering our questions was 
beneficial, and in two cases the interviewees followed up with emails that said as much). 
Instead we want to find the means to help change people like the interviewees or those 
they work with in future – programmers whom we help to learn app security – and so the 
Appreciative Inquiry method offers a valuable contribution. 
















Figure 2: Appreciative Inquiry 
The Discovery Phase typically concentrates on the positive aspects of the current 
situation, encouraging participants to visualise what has worked, and what is now 
working – hence the name ‘Appreciative’. The Dream Phase also stresses the positive, 
with participants working to establish a shared vision of the future. The Design and 
Destiny phases then continue to produce a plan for future change that has buy-in from the 
participants. 
Governing the use of the four phases is a set of five principles, which we may summarise 
simply as shown in Table 2 below.   
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Table 2: Principles of Appreciative Inquiry 
Principle Summary 
Constructionist Our beliefs determine what we do; thought and action emerge from 
relationships. 
Simultaneity Enquiry changes systems 
Poetic Organisational life is made up from stories co-generated by the 
participants 
Anticipatory What we do today is guided by our image of the future. 
Positive Positive emotions are needed to generate sustainable change. 
Appreciative Inquiry has been effective in creating organisational change in a large 
variety of different organisations [27].  To use it as a research tool requires some changes 
that are explored in detail by Reed [89]. In this research, however, we are using aspects of 
only the first two phases. Each interview concentrated on Discovery: “What do you do 
and have you done in the past that was successful and Dream: “What would you like to 
see in an ideal world?” 
2.8 Research Design  
Our main data collection was via semi-structured interviews with software development 
specialists. We chose these opportunistically, mainly through their introductions from 
former colleagues of the researcher.  
It is important to distinguish between the experts interviewed (‘interviewees’) and the 
subjects being discussed (‘programmers’). The experts chosen were not at all typical of 
app developers; some were not developers at all, and all had more experience working 
with software projects than the developer average of six years [118]. However the 
interviews suggest that between them the chosen interviewees had worked with a typical 
range of programmers. 
Time and practicality limited the number of interviews to a dozen. Guest [51] suggests 
that further interviews would be unlikely to generate much in the way of further new 
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theory. More important is, of course, whether this achieved ‘theoretical saturation’; we 
shall revisit this question in section 8.5. We started with an initial ‘pacing interview’, 
analysed that and used the results to direct future interviews.   
Table 3 below gives an overview of the experts interviewed. For each, we have given an 
indication of the nature of the companies they are currently involved with and their 
typical role. In two cases we interviewed a second person in a different role in the same 
organisation, so the table shows ‘organisation IDs’ (OID). Some were contractors 
working for more than one organisation; these are shown with an asterisk in the OID 
column and for them the table gives the organisation for which they are currently doing 
the most work.  
Table 3: The experts interviewed 
ID OID Organisation type Typical role 
P1 * Bespoke app developer Developing apps for business clients 
P2 O1 Mobile phone 
manufacturer 
Leader of large team specialising in 
security 
P3 O2 Operating system supplier Developer of user-facing web services 
P4 O3 Smart card specialists Design and implementation of smart card 
software 
P5 O4 Security-related software-
as-service supplier 




Promoting industry App security consultancy 
P7 O1 Mobile phone 
manufacturer 
Developer and software architect for OS 
services 
P8 O6 Telecoms service provider Architecting mobile phone services 
P9 O7
* 
Bank Analysis, design and implementing 
changes to web-based services 
P10 O8 Secure app technology 
provider 
Architecting and promoting app 
technologies 
P11 O2 Operating system supplier Designing and promoting security 
enhancements 
P12 * Bespoke app developer Developing apps for business clients 
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All had more than 30 years’ experience in software development, excepting P7 who has 
around 20 years. All but P1 had at least 5 years’ experience working with secure software 
development. Regrettably in terms of diversity but typically of their roles in this industry 
[29], all were male.  
2.9 About the Author  
Constructivist Grounded Theory is a relativist approach, as discussed in section 2.2. It 
considers the researcher to be part of the system being analysed. This section, therefore, 
introduces the author as a context for the findings. 
Charles Weir has experience of over 30 years in commercial software development. He 
has worked as a programmer within a large company; as a consultant training and 
assisting in a large and varied number of projects; and more recently has run a software 
development company for 15 years producing innovative bespoke software for mobile 
phones.  
A constant theme for his work over the last 25 years has been finding ways to improve 
software development. This led to early work on software testing in the 1980s, 
involvement in the patterns movement in the 1990s including the authorship of a book 
[78], and the introduction of agile development techniques in both his own company and 
others.  
In the last few years he has led projects implementing payments and mobile ticketing on 
mobile phones. Like most applications software developers he had not previously been 
involved in software security, and had indeed avoided such projects because of the 
perceived commercial risk. The learning process for software security proved painful, 
which is what motivated this research.  
The research itself led to some surprises for him. Particular was the finding that most app 
developers had no interest in security (section 5.1). This was because he had always been 
in a situation where it was obvious that unless he got app security right there would be 
bad consequences. Specifically, his company was developing apps for a 
telecommunications giant, subject to very stringent and tightly worded contracts. If they 
messed up they would be sued, and though the company’s professional indemnity 
insurance would cover any penalties, the time cost of defending such a lawsuit and the 
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resulting cost of future Professional Indemnity Insurance would probably destroy the 
company and put everyone out of work. In short, he was scared of the implications, and 
put a good deal of effort into ensuring they took a professional and responsible approach 
to app security. 
Even so, he appreciated that although he knew about that threat, his fellow programmers 
would not have realised it if he had not pointed it out. After all, the contractual 
obligations and chain of future consequences were not part of their daily programming 
job, and many of them would not have been aware of them. Therefore, though he 
personally was very concerned when he first started developing apps that had a security 
requirement, it required communication to extend that concern to his colleagues.  
The second surprise was the wide range of applicability of app security and privacy 
questions. To him, one of the first things in a new project was to identify the non-
functional requirements. Before he started the research he had mentally divided apps (and 
indeed software generally) into those with security requirements and those without. For 
the ones without, he had believed that issues like security and privacy were generally not 
of interest to app developers. In the course of this research, he learned from discussions 
with academic professionals and security consultants that any apps that hold keys or 
passwords, use HTTPs to communicate, hold personal information, send emails, or even 
just read or write the file system, are subject to implied security and privacy 
requirements. The finding that most of the developers involved in programming such 
apps do not appreciate the issues is very concerning. 
2.10  Introduction to the Interviewees 
We shall be working with these interviewees for the rest of this thesis, so it is worth 
providing a more personal introduction. The illustrations in Figure 3 introduce each more 
personally, giving each a comment chosen to reflect a flavour of the discussion.  











security. It’s in the 
process.
I love solving 
security puzzles








Hit your programmers 
with a wet fish until 
they get the message
We need whole 
system, not tick box 
security
The key is 
communication 
between teams
Give your attackers a 




We're always changing 
our defences in 












Figure 3: An introduction to the interviewees 
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2.11 Introduction to the Organisations 
All of the interviewees had one organisation for which they were predominantly working. 
In some cases this organisation was probably their only significant recent experience (P2, 
P3, P7, P11); others work sometimes or regularly with a variety of other organisations. In 
the case of the contractors (P1, P12) their relationship with their main organisation was 
for a set period, typically months. The others had been in their current roles for at least 
two years. 
Table 4 shows the organisations involved. It shows an indication of the organisation size 
(small for less than 10 staff, medium for less than 1000, large for greater than 1000, or 
government for a government department), and a subjective estimate of the organisation’s 
position on a ‘secure software capability maturity model’, such as ISO/IEC 21827:2008 
[56].   The organisations varied enormously, from global giants (O1) to companies with 
less than a dozen (O3, O8). In the case of solo programmers and smaller companies, we 
found the interviewees’ work generally involved relationships with much larger 
organisations too. 
Table 4: The organisations represented 
People Org Org. size Organisation type Est. 
CMM 
P2, P7 O1 Medium Mobile phone manufacturer High 
P3, P11 O2 Large Operating system supplier Very 
high 
P4 O3 Small Smart card specialists Medium 





Promoting industry Low 
P8 O6 Large Telecoms service provider Medium 
P9 O7 Large Bank Medium 
P10 O8 Small Secure app technology provider Medium 
P1, P12  Solo Bespoke app developer Low 
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2.12 The Interviews 
Figure 4 shows the questions used as a basis for the interviews. The questions are 
designed to be open ended, to encourage the interviewee to cover topics from their own 
points of view. Drawing on Appreciative Inquiry, they focus on the positive, on things 
that have worked and on techniques that help to achieve positive outcomes. 
Interview Schedule: Better Approaches to Secure User-facing Software 
Introduction – establish context 
 Please could you tell me something of your own background? 
 What is your current role, and what do you find yourself doing day-to-day? 
 How did you first get involved with developing secure software? 
Exploration 
 Can you think of a particular triumph in your work? How did you achieve the 
security aspects of that? 
 Please could you give examples of a secure system that has gone well? Or not 
gone well and been fixed? 
 How did you initially learn about adding security to software development? 
 How do you learn more now? 
 What aspects of your team (your work) made them particularly good at secure 
software? 
 What is the most successful technique you have found? 
 What advantages are there in the development of the app end (browser or 
mobile) over the server end? 
Clarification 
You mentioned [specific technique]. Can you tell me a little more about that? 
 
Figure 4: Interview schedule 
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In many cases interviewees covered answers to later questions in the responses to earlier 
ones, or even before any questions were asked. The clarification questions were not 
appropriate to all the interviews, so were sometimes omitted. In all cases except P7 the 
discussion around the questions took at least an hour and in some cases (P4, P5, P8 and 
P9) more than two hours.  
2.13 Analysis of the Interviews 
Some of the interview questions related to the experts’ analysis of how to achieve secure 
app development; others to their own history and ways of learning about secure app 
development. Thus we can distinguish two forms of information from the interviews: 
information about how the app security experts had achieved their expertise and kept 
themselves updated, and information they had about best learning approaches for those 
working with them. Since most of the interview content was about this second topic, 
treating the interviewees as peers to be consulted rather than subjects to be analysed, in 
this thesis we refer to those involved as ‘interviewees’ or ‘experts’.  
In this thesis we quote extensively from the interviews. To convey correctly the context 
and protect the confidentiality of the interviewees, we have amended the quotations 
appropriately: names are changed; square brackets show additions and replacements; 
ellipses show removals.
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3 Existing Research on App 
Programmers and Security 
This chapter examines the literature around the main topic of the thesis: what techniques 
and ideas will appeal to development teams and lead to them developing more secure app 
software. Thus it considers work on programmer motivation, learning and improvement.  
3.1 Two Types of Literature 
Recall the overall research question for this thesis: 
RQ1 What techniques and ideas will appeal to development teams and lead to 
them developing more secure app software? 
We found in researching literature that the existing work on the subject falls into two 
different categories: there is literature about programmers, and there is literature for 
programmers. We realised we need to analyse the two types of literature differently. In 
this chapter, therefore, we analyse literature about programmers in terms of its 
contribution to our research question. In chapter 4 we shall examine literature for 
programmers in terms of its usefulness in helping programmer learning.  
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3.2 Focus of Existing Research 
As discussed in section 1.1, existing research on the security of software development 
focuses on three aspects: 
 Programmer motivation, 
 How do programmers learn, and  
 What do programmers need to learn? 
The following sections explore each in turn. Throughout this section, we evaluate each 
work in terms of the impact and relevance it may have on the research questions we 
identified in section 1.2. In line with our pragmatic approach to the research, we comment 
on each only in respect of its relevance to those questions. 
Clearly while app development has its own environments and cultures, many of the 
problems are similar to those in other domains, especially Web UI development, and 
desktop application development, and to a lesser extent server development. We have 
found literature about programmer motivation relevant only to programmers in general, 
and similarly much of the work on how programmers learn is general. There is more 
work available specific to app developers on what they need to learn.  
Two closely related domains are Web UI software development and workstation software 
development. Certainly the study of software security for Web UIs is more mature, and 
there has been a good deal of work on specific kinds of security issue, such as cross-site 
scripting, that apply to that area. However that is not helpful to this research. On the more 
general issues of how to get development teams to deliver better software, we have found 
almost no research specific to Web UI or workstation software. 
3.3 Programmer Motivation 
This and the next section explore writings related to the research question: 
RQ2 What motivated the experts themselves to learn software security; how did 
they do so; and how do they continue to learn? 
There is a good deal of literature on programmer motivation. Beecham et al.’s survey in 
2008 [15] found some 92 papers on the subject. However virtually all of the research 
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cited is about motivation to do the job of programming, rather than motivation to change 
behaviour. There is an implicit assumption that a well-motivated programmer will do a 
‘good’ job. Tom DeMarco’s popular book on the subject, ‘Peopleware’ [33], makes the 
same assumption. 
In this work, we are interested in what makes a well-motivated developer choose a new 
form of behaviour: learning about software security.  
What Beecham et al.’s survey does in particular is to establish the kinds of things that 
motivate programmers. Specifically, they identified that professional programmers tend 
to be motivated most by: 
 Problem solving, 
 Working to benefit others, and  
 Technical challenge.  
Interestingly, a fear of failure is not among the list of motivators. So the classic security 
motivation of ‘a terrible thing might happen’ will not tend to have much impact in 
encouraging programmers to learn about security. This agrees with the findings of Xie et 
al. [112], whose survey interviewed programmers to investigate why they believed they 
made security errors; they found a consistent tendency to treat security as ‘someone else’s 
problem’. Though the results are limited in scope to highly experienced developers in US 
companies, it seems reasonable to conclude that the conclusions may apply more widely. 
We can conclude that to inspire programmers to become adept at software security will 
require emphasis on the benefits to others and the technical challenge of the problems 
involved. 
3.4 How Do Programmers Learn? 
There is relatively little literature on how programmers learn, whether about novices or 
professional programmers. Johnson and Senges [59] studied how programmers learned to 
function in a complicated organisation, Google. They concluded that the majority of 
programmer learning there was peer learning, facilitated by strong corporate standards 
and culture; obviously the results are limited to that organisation. Other studies have 
incorporated the concepts of programmer learning into the wider term of Software 
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Process Improvement (SPI). So, for example, a wide-ranging quantitative study by Dyba 
[36] examines learning as one aspect of SPI; it differentiates Exploitation, the 
dissemination of existing knowledge, from Exploration, the gaining of new knowledge; it 
concludes that both have a positive effect on productivity but does not explore 
mechanisms. 
A little-known work by Enes and Conradi [40] used interviews to discover how 
professionals, including programmers, acquire their expert knowledge. It concludes that 
the preferred learning mechanisms are all informal ones: especially on-the job training 
and personal interaction. It also highlights, as an important factor, professional pride in 
having ‘expert areas’ of competence. Unfortunately for our purposes, the results include 
only a very small sample of programmers (4) in a limited area (Trondheim). 
Murphy-Hill et al. explored how developers find new software tools [72]; the research 
was more wide-ranging and included both an initial survey and a larger scale, 79 
participant, diary-based survey. They concluded the event is relatively rare, and happens 
more through joint working than recommendations, though the only solution proposed 
was to create a tool recommendation website. Proksch et al. used an extensive and 
carefully analysed literature survey to explore such a recommendation site in detail [85]; 
the result reads as a requirements specification. So far there is little evidence of such 
systems being trialled in practice. 
In the context of learning about software security, a particularly important finding is that 
of Conradi and Dyba [26]. Based on interviews with 21 development team members in 5 
Norwegian companies, they analysed carefully the effectiveness of written routines on 
software process improvement. They identified that programmers have difficulty with 
learning from the output of process improvers, and particularly with learning from formal 
written routines. As a result, developers tend to avoid such approaches: 
Developers are rather sceptical at using written routines, while quality and 
technical managers are taking this for granted. This is an explosive 
combination. (Conradi and Dyba [26]) 
This suggests an ‘impedance mismatch’ between those who write instructions and 
processes for developers, and the developers themselves who are expected to carry them 
out. While the geographical scope of the research gives it limited external validity, 
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anecdotal evidence and personal experience of the authors tends to confirm the finding in 
respect of UK and US developers. We can speculate that security experts tend to think in 
terms of complete lists of issues and ways to break software; developers think in terms of 
simplest ways to create desired functionality.  
Thus though one might expect the most effective approach to teaching security to be a 
prescriptive set of instructions to programmers what to do, a ‘Secure Development 
Lifecycle’ such as those promoted by Microsoft [69] and others, in practice those do not 
appeal to developers. This conforms to the author’s own experience; he has never 
encountered an app development team voluntarily adopting a process of that kind. This 
means that for app developers we need to find a more lightweight, less prescriptive 
approach. 
A different approach to teaching programmers was the ‘patterns’ movement, discussed in 
more detail in section 4.2. Yskout et al. tested experimentally the effect of using security 
patterns in server design; though the paper states there was no benefit, in fact the results 
suggest a benefit but were statistically inconclusive [116]. 
Recently several teams have investigated how app developers learn security. Balebako et 
al. interviewed a dozen app developers in small to medium sized US companies, and 
surveyed over 200 US app developers to find out their approach to security and privacy 
issues. The survey was carefully constructed to avoid bias, and concluded that most 
developers approach these issues using web search, or by consulting peers [10]. 
Interestingly they also found that security and privacy behaviours were only weakly 
correlated.  
A survey by Acar et al. [2] also concluded through a survey of nearly 300 successful app 
developers worldwide that they learned security through web search and peers. They went 
on to use a well-crafted practical experiment with over 50 Android developers to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the different ways of learning app security; this produced the 
surprising result that programmers using digital books achieved better security than those 
using web search.   
Two projects, by Xie et al. and Nguyen et al., have developed IDE-based tools to teach 
programmers by detecting possible security flaws in Android developments [77,111]. The 
approach is promising, but obviously requires programmers to adopt the tools; also Xie et 
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al.’s project is now finished and Nguyen’s has not yet reached the stage where its 
effectiveness can be tested. Others, such as Near and Jackson, and Lerch et al. [65,76], 
have code analysis tools to detect security defects; these work but provide only limited 
feedback to developers. So far we are not aware of any literature analysing the 
effectiveness of such approaches. 
3.5 What Do Programmers Need to Learn? 
In exploring the next research question, 
RQ3 What are the most effective techniques to deliver app security? 
we may be able to establish what kinds of learning are required from looking at the 
security issues found in the past work of programmers. 
Enck’s ‘Study of Android Application Security’ [39] used binary code analysis of a large 
number of free Android applications. This approach is limited to the kinds of error that 
can be found with such analysis. Thus they found misuse of APIs, such as using 
cryptographic APIs in ways that reduced the security provided by the cryptography; and 
they found access to privacy-sensitive APIs, such as APIs that gave personal information 
about the user. They could not find errors such as insecure storage of credentials (in 
publicly accessible files, for example) or misuse of insecure network connections (such as 
using HTTP where HTTPS was needed). Fahl’s analysis of Android SSL insecurity [42] 
used a similar approach to analyse apps’ use of secure web connections; again they are 
limited to detecting inappropriate use of SSL APIs, which they found in 8% of apps. 
Certainly we can conclude from both papers that developers need to be mindful of careful 
API usage. 
A recent paper by Nadi et al. [74] uses surveys of programmers and of their comments on 
discussion pages to examine the reasons why developers had issues using these SSL 
APIs. They were asking developers who had had trouble, which for our purposes might 
be regarded as sample bias. Unsurprisingly the conclusion could best be summarised as 
‘because the APIs are difficult to use’, with the recommended solution being to document 
them or to wrap them with libraries or code generation tools; it appears from this paper 
too that developers do not see education on security as something they need. 
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Vidas et al.’s paper ‘All Your Droid Are Belong To Us’ [105] takes a different approach, 
and examines attacks on Android phones. This is not in the context of app security, but 
rather in the context of the whole phone, where apps are seen as potential malware and 
the solutions are in terms of OS improvements. Acar et al.’s recent literature survey of 
Android app security [1] provides a comprehensive view of the state of the art, 
concluding that improvements to APIs and the use of web technologies are helping; 
however they do not otherwise address the expertise of developers. 
The openness of Android encourages such studies, but iOS gave rise to a smaller number 
of similar evaluations such as that of Dai Zovi [31]. Unfortunately for our purposes this 
reads more as a summary of the security facilities provided by Apple rather than an 
objective and critical assessment of risks to app developers. 
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4 Learning Resources for 
Programmers 
This chapter continues the literature survey by examining learning resources available to 
programmers. It explores three different movements that have led to the creation of such 
literature: the security patterns movement, the practitioners’ movement and black hat 
literature. It then considers other resources available: web-based static sites and video. It 
uses rankings to indicate which are most used by developers. 
4.1 Introduction 
Our final research question in section 1.2 asked: 
RQ4 How should we effectively introduce security to app development 
teams? 
To address this we need resources to help programmers to learn. Whereas chapter 3 
explores research on how programmers learn; this chapter looks at the resources available 
on good practice that may appeal to and benefit programmers. 
We identified several categories of such resource as follows:  
1. Static literature such as books, e-books and papers; 
2. Websites, blogs, and bulletin boards; and  
3. Online video 
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To evaluate the resources, we need to consider what attributes we need from them. Since 
we are looking for learning tools, academic validity though relevant must be matched 
against considerations such as ease of access, readability, approachability and didactic 
approach. For example, academic papers that are not freely available on the web are 
unlikely to be widely used by non-academic programmers, as are books that are out of 
print. Similarly books that sacrifice readability for academic rigour or completeness may 
be forced on students doing academic courses, but are unlikely to be widely read by 
developers if they have the choice of more readable alternatives. 
There are many excellent books describing the theory and practice of software security, 
such as Gollman’s ‘Computer Security’ [49], Pfleeger ‘Security in Computing’ [82], 
Schneier ‘Secrets and Lies’ [93] and Anderson ‘Security Engineering’ [7] ; these work at 
a level that is not helpful as anything but background reference for a software developer.  
Surprisingly few books are targeted at software engineers. Three separate approaches 
appear to have led to such material: the security patterns approach, the security 
practitioners’ approach, and the black hat approach. We explore each of these in the 
following sections. 
4.2 Security Patterns 
Security patterns are a development from the software design patterns movement first 
brought into prominence with the ‘Design Patterns’ book [46], a very popular book with 
programmers.  This was in turn built on the architectural patterns work by Christopher 
Alexander [5].  An important feature of patterns is that they divide up a problem domain 
and provide multiple positive solutions. A series of patterns may provide a variety of 
competing solutions for the same problem, and the patterns will provide information 
(‘forces’) to help practitioners decide which one to use. ‘Design Patterns’ describes a set 
of ways to structure object-oriented code, mainly to achieve good partitioning between 
components. The term ‘Security patterns’ extended this idea to mean ‘Design patterns 
associated with software security’. 
The security patterns literature shows strong signs of its position as the meeting of two 
cultures. The patterns movement authors emphasise the positive aspects of their work 
(‘solutions’) and single out particular aspects of a domain; the security movement authors 
emphasise restrictions (‘threats’) and aim for complete coverage of a domain.   
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The earliest security patterns paper ‘Architectural Patterns… ‘ was written by design 
patterns experts Yoder and Barcalaw [113], and is designed to be approachable to 
programmers.  Though the patterns are straightforward and high level, the detail in each 
is quite complicated to follow. ‘Security Design Patterns, part 1’ by Romanovski [91] is 
another early attempt to distil security patterns. It reads as fairly naïve, without the 
authority and references one might expect.  
Kienzl et al.’s ‘Security Patterns Repository’ [63] describes some 20 ‘structural patterns’, 
with noun names like ‘trusted proxy’; and some 10 ‘procedural patterns’, with verb 
names like ‘document the security goals’.  Though some are ‘mini-patterns’ only 
sketchily described, most are valid and useful explorations of security techniques for app 
developers; and each includes an examination of the impact on different aspects of 
security and performance. A version is publicly available. 
Of the two best-known security patterns books, ‘Core Security Patterns’ [98] attempts to 
cover the entire domain of Java Enterprise security, but is now somewhat out of date; 
naturally it avoids dealing with application software. The book ‘Security Patterns…’ by 
Schumacher et al. [94] incorporates work by several authors and teams, covering security 
analysis through to implementation, though it too has little on application security. 
Unfortunately the early chapters read as a ‘secure process’, with the same issues as 
highlighted by Conradi and Dyba (see section 3.4). Bejtlich, a respected industry expert, 
included ‘Security Patterns’ in a comparative review [16] but found it less valuable in 
practice than other books discussed in the next section.  
How valid are security patterns as learning material for programmers? Clearly there is 
bound to be overlap: surveys of the literature written between 1997 and 2005, the main 
days of the patterns movement, claimed variously only 179 distinct patterns [52] or only 
36 ‘true’ patterns [114] out of the several hundred available. Yskout et al. trialled a 
controlled experiment to see if developers benefitted from using security patterns [116]; 
the results suggested a benefit, but were statistically inconclusive. 
Interestingly, there has been surprisingly little effort since that time to add to the canon of 
software security patterns. Much recent pattern-related literature in the security field has 
used the name ‘pattern’ in its wider sense, referring to the categorisation of similarities 
across different items (such as attacks, or text for analysis), rather than ‘security design 
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patterns’ as tools for developers and practitioners; an example is the book ‘Cyberpatterns’ 
[17]. 
4.3 The Practitioners’ Movement 
Security practitioners’ literature for programmers comes from people studying software 
security, who offer their knowledge in a form suitable for programmers. The most 
approachable we encountered is Gary McGraw’s ‘Software Security’ [68], which both 
sets forward a clear approach, and uses a fairly readable style [16]; however it is 
structured as a secure development process, which limits its appeal to developers (see 
section 3.4).  
The most useful learning books for software developers are those that convey information 
in a relatively terse and readable form, and in manageable chunks. For this Howard, 
LeBlanc and Viega’s  ‘24 Deadly Sins of Software Security’ [55] provides a good 
introduction; its format is similar to that of the patterns literature. 
An alternative resource is books targeted specifically at particular platforms. For Android, 
there are books explaining the security model and development techniques; examples 
include ‘Pro Android 4’ [64] and ‘Android Security Internals’ [38]. The first provides 
general security techniques and code in one chapter; the second provides a more complete 
overview of the Android security system; both provide examples. For iOS there are 
equivalents, such as ‘Learning iOS Security’ [11]; though this is more a description of 
security features than a guide to avoiding security issues. 
On the web, Apple has web pages to help developers learn the details of app security for 
iOS [8]; Google provides a rather more rudimentary set of hints for Android [50]. All of 
these platform-specific resources consider only code-level security and do not emphasise 
the ‘whole system security’ aspects of app development. 
4.4 Black Hat Literature 
Some of the most popular (see 4.5) platform-specific security books are the ones with a 
‘Black Hat’, attacker, approach. For example the Android Hacker’s Handbook [35], and 
its corresponding versions for iOS and web apps, contain a good deal about exploits 
against the operating system, a certain amount about analysing existing apps, but little 
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about how to guard against exploits as a developer. The split into chapters each 
examining an area with a consistent format is reminiscent of the patterns literature. 
Further books in the same series include versions for Web Applications, for Mobile 
Applications, and for iOS applications. Chell’s Mobile Hacker’s Handbook [22] takes a 
similar approach, covering iOS, Android and even Blackberry platforms, and does 
provide limited advice for developers. 
There are a number of papers exploring weaknesses in mobile apps, especially Android, 
and possible reasons for them. For example Egele et al. studied the misuse of 
cryptographic APIs [37], concluding that it was widespread and required better APIs; 
Fahl et al. [42] studied SSL use, concluded some apps were vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks, and suggested ways to solve the problems; however the academic format 
doesn’t appeal to most developers. 
4.5 What Books Do Programmers Use? 
We can gain some idea of the popularity of books from their sales on an international 
bookseller such as Amazon. Chevalier has established that this correlates well with actual 
sales [23]. We should of course be wary of making deductions from these figures: we do 
not know the proportion of purchasers who are programmers; we do not know how many 
readers share books via libraries or other ways; and we do not know what fraction of 
purchasers do not read the books. Table 5, however, shows selected rankings. 
Table 5: Amazon rankings for selected books at January 2016 
 Book and reference Amazon bestseller rank (‘000) 
(Low numbers mean popular) 
Design Patterns, Gamma [46] 24 
Android Hacker’s Handbook [35]  86 
Security Engineering, Anderson [7] 120 
Secrets and Lies, Schneier [93] 141 
Android Security Cookbook [67] 512 
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Software Security, McGraw [68] 627 
Learning iOS Security [11] 900 
Security Patterns [94] 918 
Application Security for the Android 
Platform [96]  
1218 
Core Security Patterns [98] 1466 
From this we can see that the most popular security books are indeed those that take a 
‘black hat’ approach in a specific domain, followed by the general overview books. 
McGraw’s book, and the more ‘white hat’ approaches to software development sell 
relatively badly, and the security patterns books sell hardly at all. By comparison with the 
sales of the ‘Design Patterns’ book we can conclude that only the black hat, ‘Android 
Hacker’s handbook’, approaches being a book that might be expected to be found on 
many bookshelves. 
This correlates with the finding of section 5.1 that few programmers are motivated to find 
out about software security; it also correlates with the finding of section 3.4 that secure 
development processes such as those of McGraw’s book do not appeal to software 
developers. 
4.6 Web-Based Information Sources 
Software security is a fast-moving area, and website-based sources have the advantage of 
being easy to update, and easy to build progressively as resources allow. They have a 
further advantage: web links are easy to insert into discussions or answers on the most 
popular programmer sites such as Stack Overflow.  
The classic application developer site on application security is Microsoft’s [70]. It covers 
a range of topics ranging from Microsoft’s complete secure development life-cycle, to 
implementation details for securing Microsoft products. It has the disadvantage of 
stressing a process-based approach, the Microsoft Secure Development Process, which 
may limit its appeal to developers (see section 3.4). Apple has web pages to help 
      36 
developers learn the details of app security for iOS [8]; Google provides a rather more 
rudimentary set of hints for Android [50]. Both are valuable, but strictly technical – they 
consider only coding aspects and ignore ‘whole system security’ issues. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) community-written ‘Developer 
Guide’ [119] has a great deal of content, but is difficult to access in a manageable form; 
all the information is in Markdown format, and there do not appear to be compiled PDF 
or e-book formats. It is unlikely that many programmers access it. Another document 
deriving from the OWASP source is ENISA’s ‘Smartphones Secure Development 
Guidelines for App Developers’ [41]. This is a tersely written list of do’s and don’ts for 
secure app development; it does consider wider issues than the strictly technical, but is 
not an easy read for those inexperienced with security. 
The community-written OWASP Top Ten Mobile Risks site [120] is a widely accessed
1
 
resource detailing specific programming issues and how to avoid them. Its authority and 
availability make it very effective, though it does not consider ‘whole system security’ 
issues. A further commonly referenced resource is the SANS Institute site [92]. SANS is 
a commercial organisation supplying training as well as free information services, and 
does have a ‘whole system security’ approach. However SANS has little information 
specific to app development. 
Some third parties have also constructed websites. A particularly approachable one is the 
Android developer security site by popular blogger Simon Judge [60]; it divides its 
content into a collection of separate homilies, each argued independently.  Again the 
format is reminiscent of the patterns form. Though approachable, it has not been widely 
accessed by programmers [61]. 
App programmers tend to use web search and discussion sites as their primary source of 
information on security [2]. For programming questions, the two dominant sites are of 
course Google and Stack Overflow. There was more than a touch of truth underlying the 
joke suggestion that programming be renamed ‘Googling Stack Overflow’ [102].    The 
main programmers’ Stack Overflow site has a substantial set of discussions covering 
                                                 
1
 Based on Google rankings in February 2016 
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application security
2
. A separate Stack Overflow site is devoted specifically to security, 
but tends not to handle programming questions. 
Unfortunately, as a learning resource, Stack Overflow and similar bulletin boards have a 
significant flaw: they are poor for gaining an overview to a topic, and actively discourage 
questions that do not have focussed answers. Requests for help on security are generally 
answered with references to the resources listed earlier in this section. A detailed analysis 
of the topics on the Stack Overflow site [12] found little in the way of overview 
discussions. Thus Stack Overflow is valuable in helping programmers sort out problems 
they know they have, but does not point out problems that they do not know they may 
have; most security problems are likely to be of this second type. 
Discussion sites have a second problem related to security: their answers tend to be of 
questionable accuracy especially when they quote code. Acar et al. [2] analysed answers 
on Stack Overflow to app security questions, with worrying conclusions: 
[Of 139 threads analysed] we categorised 41 threads as being on-topic… Of 
these, 20 threads contained code snippets. Half of the threads containing 
code snippets contained only insecure snippets. (Acar et al. [2]) 
                                                 
2
 1400 tagged ‘Android’ and ‘Security’; 700 tagged ‘iOS’ and ‘Security’. 18 Dec 2015. 
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5 Motivation and Approaches 
to App Security 
This chapter discusses findings from the Grounded Theory analysis. It examines the 
motivation and approaches for developers to learn about and implement app security. 
First we introduce the surprising discovery that few app developers are motivated to learn 
about security, let alone implement it. Then we examine the original motivations of the 
interviewees to learn app security and their approach to continued learning; we contrast 
their different approaches to working with others; we conclude that the discipline of app 
security is at an early stage of development, and suggest how it may develop.  
5.1 Why Is Motivation Important? 
Early in the cycle of interviews, we learned that actually most programmers have very 
little interest in security for mobile apps.  
Very, very, few developers are actually interested in security (P1) 
Thus the answer to the question ‘how do programmers learn about security’ most often 
seemed to be ‘they don’t’. The reason for that lies in motivation; most app programmers 
have little motivation to work on security.  
“You can see that from the Apps World [exhibition] where there’s no 
mention of security at all. It’s not on people’s radar.” (P1). 
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Accordingly this chapter explores motivation: what motivates the interviewees 
themselves to implement security in their systems; and how best they encourage that 
motivation in others.  
5.2 What Motivates Our Interviewees? 
The experts differed widely in their original reasons for learning about software security; 
there was correspondingly little agreement on how best to motivate app programmers 
generally to produce good secure apps.  
The Grounded Theory analysis of the interviews highlighted four forces motivating a 




Figure 5: Motivation forces on a programmer 
These forces are as follows, with some examples from the interviewees. 
Knowledge: the knowledge and skills that the programmers have learned in the past or 
gained through experience on how to deal with software security issues. 
I never learned from reading books; I never took any courses at college on 
computer security. All of my work was basically self-taught. I think that there 
are certain people who have a passion for information security, and those 
are the people… It is hard to learn academically. (P11)  
Tasks: the formal and informal assignments of code to write, changes to make, training, 
and related work that the programmer has as their overt job. 
      40 
So, we send a couple of staff every year to the [OS Manufacturers] 
Conference. And secondly, [we learn from] information from our suppliers … 
technical information. (P2) 
Worries: the concerns and fears the programmer has about what they are doing. 
[I was called out to handle a security issue] and so it was Christmas Eve I 
was driving down to a data centre, doing a complete factory reinstall to wipe 
out any traces of it, couldn't get back to my family. And I said “I never want 
to have this happen again, and I am going to do everything I can to make 
sure this never happens again” P11 
Enthusiasms: the positive inspirations that motivate the programmer to make specific 
choices. 
“Actually when I was a kid – fortunately, I never released any of this stuff – I 
did actually take copy protection off games for the intellectual challenge of 
this” (P3) 
Surprisingly, we found a tension between these as two pairs of alternatives: those who 
saw knowledge as a motivation did not feel the need for explicit tasks and vice versa; 
those who felt worries were a motivation did not consider enthusiasm and vice versa. 
Therefore, where an expert’s interview expressed a position on these forces we express 
that position as a location on a scale: knowledge versus tasks, and worries versus 
enthusiasms. For example, an expert who expressed strong views that security should be 
part of every relevant activity in software development would be represented at the 
‘knowledge’ end of the scale; an expert who mildly suggested that security could be 
included as the tasks of penetration testing and app hardening would be placed towards 
the ‘tasks’ end of the scale.  
We found similar tensions between approaches to different views on implementing 
security and on the role of teamwork. These tensions we also represented on a second pair 
of scales: teamwork versus individual rigour, and influencing versus directive 
approaches. A third pair of scales compares a preference for checklists versus individual 
rigour, and for considering the attacker versus considering stakeholders. 
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Thus in diagrams in the following sections 5.3 and 5.4 we position the views or 
information expressed by experts on specific topics against axes representing each of the 
two related scales. Each diagram shows only the experts who expressed a clear opinion, 
and shows clusters where several shared roughly the same position. The resulting pattern 
highlights the range of views expressed. 
5.3 Reasons for Learning 
Some of the interview questions were about the experts’ own experience and histories 
(treating the interviewees as subjects – see section 2.13). The Grounded Theory analysis 
highlighted differences in the interviewees’ own motivations for both originally learning 
about software security, and for continuing to learn. 
5.3.1 Experts’ Reasons for Learning 
Figure 6 expresses the original motivations for the experts themselves for learning about 
software security. Where they learned ‘accidentally’ or while doing other things, this is 
shown towards the ‘knowledge’ end of the axis; where they learned as a specific part of 
their job it is a task. Similar the vertical axis shows whether they learned out of 
















Figure 6: Reasons for original learning 
The reasons varied significantly. Most had learned from day-to-day experience, given 
enthusiasm for the security aspects of that experience; some had started as hackers: 
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So the first security problem I ran into was at my dad's businesses. He was 
using it for accounts, and … the accounting system had a bug … that was 
affecting his balance sheets – he had a deadline! … So we needed to find a 
way of making a copy of copy protected software. … So I started off with 
hacking there, and it became a challenge so I then started hacking anything 
else that was protected! I developed quite a high sophistication in terms of 
disc based security, which would later be of huge benefit to me. 
Others had started on projects which required security:  
“[While at college] I had three very fun summers working on top secret 
projects and things like that, which had a fair amount of security in it.” (P12) 
“I did a lot of firmware work on a magnetic stripe card reader ... that had a 
number of security features… I definitely got the [security] bug there”. (P4) 
Only P1 had decided to learn about software security as a career decision – to build 
experience and credibility in a new area. 
[I went out and] I discovered [about security]: black hats and white hats. [I] 
go and talk to [them], and go to conferences and see what the attackers are 
doing.  
5.3.2 Experts’ Reasons for Continued Learning  
Looking at the experts’ reasons for continued learning, it emerged that there was more 
consistency; for most it was an informal task in addition to their normal day job, and they 
did it on an ad-hoc basis. Only P3 and P11, who work for a global, security aware, 
company, received security-related training; and P1, in his role as author, assigned app 
security learning as part of his normal work. Most kept up to date through a background 
task of following appropriate internet media – Bruce Schneier’s ‘Crypto-Gram’ email 
[19] was the most commonly mentioned medium (P3, P7, P8), or:  
“My work screen has a Twitter feed just running up the right hand side. 
Whenever I get to enough of a break that I can glance over I'll take a look at 
whatever is currently up there.” (P7) 
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“I listen to a few podcasts… Security Now… with Steve Gibson on the TWiT 
Network” (P12) 
Figure 7 shows the experts’ reasons for their continued learning. Not all the interviews 












Figure 7: Motivation for continued learning 
5.4 Motivating Programmers to Learn 
The following sections analyse the responses of interviewees consulted as experts, rather 
than subjects.  
The GT analysis showed a key category of the discussions to be ‘how to motivate 
programmers’. This section explores the interviewees’ views on ways of motivating 
programmers; it showed an unexpected disparity between their approaches. 
All the interviewees who discussed programmer behaviour stressed that programmers had 
a tendency to avoid security issues and concentrate on delivering functionality. Some 
highlighted that few undergraduate level computing courses incorporate security into 
normal examples and practice.  
“So for the majority of people who are currently going through various 
computer science degrees, security doesn't really come into it at all, in any 
real context”. (P10) 
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Many correlated general life experience, software development experience, and especially 
formal software development experience with ability at software security. They stressed 
the difficulty in motivating inexperienced developers: 
“When I'm talking to 22 year old phenomenally brilliant mathematician 
software developer who has got almost no life experience at all – how do I 
make him care about things that seem unimportant to him?” (P5) 
However the interviewees showed little consistency in their approaches to solving this 
problem and motivating programmers to work on security, as follows.  
5.4.1 Enthusiasm or Worry? 
Some felt the motivation for security should be worry, where the impact of poor security 
is a threat to the programmers: 
“We’ll need a mass security event [caused by a mobile app] to get 
programmers to take app security seriously” (P1) 
Other saw it better as an enthusiasm, wanting programmers to be passionate about doing a 
good job on security: 
“trying to talk to my developers about this and trying to come up with 
techniques that make them think about it in a way that makes them care about 
it” (P5) 
This sometimes could also be a reaction to the costs of the ‘worry’ approach: 
There are too many technologists and guys with sensible shoes whose 
mission is to make you frightened, that will make you pay an awful lot of 
money, and whether you  are Deloittes or Ernst and Young, or whoever,  
privacy impact assessment, on and on it goes. (P5) 
5.4.2 Knowledge or Task-Based? 
Some represented making systems secure as part of a process, where developers do the 
right thing because they are expert and knowledgeable: 
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“So you are going to have to get developers to understand computer science, 
and the consequences of the code they are writing” (P6) 
Others saw the adding of and planning of security as part of the functionality 
requirements and thus as a specific task.  
“Mine is much more practical. I need it to work, I'll put something together 
that actually does the job, and I will learn whatever I need to learn to do that. 
And then move on, if necessary.” (P4) 
We observe that these external motivators for programmers naturally follow the same 
axes as the motivators the experts had had for their own learning. Figure 8 shows how the 











Figure 8: Recommendations how to motivate app programmers 
5.5 Approach to Teamwork on Security 
The GT analysis also highlighted a key topic ‘Security in the development process’. 
Further analysis showed a key category of team approaches to achieve app security. 
Whilst the experts tended to agree on the importance of this, they differed on best 
approaches to achieve it. This section explores their approaches both to teamwork and to 
changing the behaviour of those teams. We found a considerable variation in approaches, 
and have highlighted these in a diagram similar to those in the previous sections. 
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5.5.1 Teamwork versus Individual Rigor 
There was agreement that team attitudes are very important in creating secure software. 
Some experts stressed the communication between and within teams: 
“And I think one thing that we were incredibly good at with [a specific 
project], is bringing the entire project team together probably with the aid of, 
as well as the formal meetings, some of the more casual discussions over a 
beer. And so everybody fully understood the scope of what everyone was 
bringing to the table and there was never any of the artificial formalities that 
sometimes you can get around these projects where it feels uncomfortable to 
pick the phone up to somebody.” (P8)   
Others stressed individual rigor, as their primary tool. For example:  
“I tend to look at things in a stepwise way. Certainly when you’re evolving 
software, you don’t necessarily have formal proof but you can go in 
sufficiently simple steps that you can see that it’s obviously correct.” (P12)   
We saw the latter view expressed usually related to single developer situations where 
there were no others with whom to discuss security. 
5.5.2 Changing Behaviour - Influencing versus Directing 
Another distinction that emerged is that some saw their best means for they themselves to 
influence the team members as directive, exerting authority:  
“I had success [by] whacking them over the head with a wet fish” (P7, speaking 
metaphorically).  
Others saw their role as influencing, questioning and encouraging:  
“[I] throw out a few 'what ifs' you know, what if I did that, and get somebody who is 
aware and will have an understanding of what you are suggesting, and they will counter 
with a sensible response.” (P8).  
Figure 9 shows these two contrasts. 















Figure 9: Expectation of team interaction 
Though one might expect the choice of influencing vs directing to reflect the expert’s 
authority in the organisation, in fact this was not necessarily the case. For example P5’s 
role gave him authority and P7 was referring to peers. 
5.6 Approach to Implementing Security 
In terms of knowledge transfer and implementing app security the GT analysis showed 
two key categories: ‘tick-box security’, which evoked both positive and negative 
reactions; and  ‘whole system security’, which was implied by many of the experts; there 
was also a surprising distinction on which counterparties the experts considered: potential 
attackers or project stakeholders such as product managers. These were more nuanced, 
reflecting differences in emphasis.  
5.6.1 Checklists or Whole System Security? 
Some experts preferred a checklist, excellent-coding attitude to security: 
“Checklists I think are wonderful things. And if they are Why, How, What, 
Where, When, not just 'does it' – it's not just a 'yes / no'. It’s a checklist that 
goes, in what way have you done this?” (P5) 
The experts expressed concern even about programmers who do appreciate the need for 
security. This is most typical of programmers working in projects with regulatory 
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implications, such as the ‘Eurocard, MasterCard, Visa’ (EMV) rules for privacy. Most 
developers in that situation see their obligation as ‘satisfying the requirements’, and 
ticking the boxes on a list of ‘things that could go wrong’, rather than using these as tools 
to implement a secure system for the sake of the users and stakeholders who will suffer in 
the event of a breach. 
Perhaps that is why [learning nitty gritty details of coding faults] is popular 
– it is relatively easy to read about in half an hour and say 'I understand 
what a buffer overflow is – I'm not going to do that anymore' (P6) 
Many interviewees stressed the importance of various aspects of Whole System security: 
“I would just wish that education was better and that developers understood 
about separation of code and data and Saltzer and Schroeder’s 8 principles 
of computer security, and understood the background more and focussed less 
on the top 10 vulnerabilities – what they happen to be this year.” (P6) 
5.6.2 Concentrate on Attacker or Stakeholder? 
There was an interesting distinction as to whether the emphasis was more on potential 
attackers, or on stakeholders such as product managers. Some emphasised the importance 
of understanding and reacting to different kinds of attackers: 
“You also try and understand why someone is coming to your service in the 
first place. And try to give them what they want up front, so they lose interest 
and go away.” (P9) 
Others emphasised the importance of negotiation with stakeholders on what security was 
put in the product: 
[When I started] a project I’d go back and ask [my customer]… ‘how secure 
do you want it to be?’ (P1) 
Figure 10 shows these differences in emphasis. 















Figure 10: Preferred approach to app security 
5.7 Summary and Implications 
This chapter examined findings from our interviewees related to the research questions 
RQ2 What motivated the experts themselves to learn software security; how 
did they do so; and how do they continue to learn? 
and 
RQ4 How should we effectively introduce security to app development 
teams? 
Related to RQ2, we observed in section 5.3 a variety of different motivations for the 
experts to learn and continue learning software security. Related to RQ4, we observed in 
section 5.6 a lack of consistent emphasis on different secure app development techniques, 
and we observed in section 5.3 notable differences of opinion on how to motivate 
programmers to security, as highlighted by the spread of the points in Figure 8. Section 
5.5 showed even stronger contrasts in experts’ approaches to teamwork in Figure 9, and 
their approaches to app security in Figure 10.  
The authors had experienced a similar lack of consistency in the early days of both the 
object oriented design paradigm (OOD) and the Agile development paradigm, each of 
which in due course converged into well accepted approaches: around UML and Scrum 
respectively. In the early days of each there were many good ideas and many experts 
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championing different aspects of those ideas; the current situation in secure app 
development has a similar character. This suggests that the discipline of app development 
security is still at an early stage. 
The convergence around UML and Scrum led to greatly increased programmer 
acceptance and knowledge of OOD and Agile development respectively. We suggest that 
similar convergence in app development security will lead to greatly improved 
programmer knowledge in that area. Looking at the history of object oriented design and 
agile development we believe two steps are likely to lead to this convergence. First is the 
codification of the main principles by well-respected experts in a popular form: a book, 
online resource or even video. Second is the championing of that codification by one or 
more large commercial organisations. Microsoft and Google are likely contenders, but 
both are tainted by their commitments to specific mobile platforms so it remains to be 
seen which organisation may champion a global approach. 
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6 Introduction to Dialectical 
Security 
This chapter introduces our findings from the interviews on good strategies for 
programmers to produce secure app code. It discusses the method used, and theorises that 
each strategy represents a form of dialectical interaction. To explore these, it introduces 
three personas representing different types of programmer, and outlines the strategies 
themselves as a set of named techniques. 
6.1 Introducing Dialectic 
This chapter examines findings from our interviews related to the research question 
RQ3 What are the most effective techniques to deliver app security? 
Grounded Theory emphasises the creation of theory from data; the theory generated 
should cover the greatest variation in the data. Our initial GT analysis of the transcribed 
interviews suggested that our experts considered ‘tick-box’ security implied by standards 
like EMV to be insufficient and were proposing an approach to programming security 
that affects the full development lifecycle: 
So implicit in [conventional thinking] is the notion that programmers decide 
what they are doing in code, which, to a degree, yes – it is how you might 
implement an algorithm – but the single biggest fault around that is, not 
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around that question, but around programmers … being told to put 
something in place without them understanding the greater implication. (P9) 
Our initial analysis therefore suggested that the experts were providing taxonomy of 
‘whole system security’ techniques suitable for app developers. However on closer 
inspection we found that the interviews contained little mention of important parts of this 
taxonomy: for example devising mitigations or using checklists of possible errors.   
Instead we observed that the core theme was the nature of a developer’s interaction with 
external parties. The word ‘dialectic’ had previously surfaced as a description for the 
review, penetration testing, and automated tool review aspects of good security practice 
[107].  ‘Dialectic’ means the finding out of knowledge, especially logical inconsistencies, 
through one person questioning another. The dialectical approach is best known as the 
technique used by the Greek philosopher Socrates in his dialogs; the reader may explore 
it in more detail from the extensive Wikipedia page on the subject [110]. It became clear 
that the friendly adversarial approach suggested by this term covers most of the other 
aspects stressed by our interviewees, and this led to us categorising the relevant 
techniques as ‘Dialectical Security’3.  
It was not hard to work out why dialectic is valuable. Programmers have to think what 
approaches an attacker might use to gain benefit from the system they are producing, and 
then to decide what to do to thwart those approaches. 
Yes, the question is 'who is the attacker, who is the bad guy, who is the threat 
model you are dealing with?' (P3)
This is very different from ‘normal programming’. Normal programming is about finding 
a good way to achieve a given set of functionality (as suggested by, say, Jackson et al. 
[57]). There is very little in normal programming about dealing with the attacks of 
unpleasant and possibly unwashed crooks.  
They are very devious; there are exploits that they have realised which are, 
well, you wouldn't really think like that if you were an engineer (P2) 
                                                 
3
 This has no connection with Marxist ‘Dialectical Materialism’, whose adversary is the unfolding of 
history. 
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The people who seem to be good at it (P9, P11) take a delight in the battle. Most 
programmers do not enjoy battles, being typically introverted and preferring cooperation 
[99]. Dialectical Security, however, provides techniques to take developers (whether 
developers, testers or other team members) and challenge them to make them think in 
ways that make for efficient security. 
6.2 Documenting Good Practice 
Since we are documenting good development practice, we use a format derived from the 
most effective way so far discovered to document programming and design practices: the 
‘pattern’ format (see section 4.2). The author’s own experience of using patterns for 
teaching and learning has led to modification to that format. He has given a number of 
seminars based on ‘Small Memory’ patterns [78].  Initially he used the conventional 
pattern approach, in which he described an abstract problem, a context and forces, and an 
abstract solution, and then moved on from there to specific ‘known uses’ and 
implementation notes. He found that this approach was difficult for programmers to relate 
to, and correspondingly saw little engagement. So he tried a different approach, which 
was to start with a specific example of a problem with a very specific solution; that is 
easy and concrete for programmers and technical teams to understand, and seems to be 
what they enjoy. Following that it was straightforward to widen the scope into something 
more like the pattern form: “when you think about it, you will see this is an example of a 
wider problem…” Then, grounded with the understanding of a particular use, he found 
the audience would follow the more abstract reasoning very happily. 
We deduce that adopting a similar approach in writing will also lead to better 
understanding. Accordingly, to make the learning in this section easy to follow each 
description here starts with a concrete example of the full technique and moves out to 
explore wider implications. Each therefore starts with a particular illustration of both the 
problem and how it was solved, then generalises it to a more general problem. It then 
discusses a recommended solution to that problem, and ends with discussion of aspects of 
the technique. The context is the same for all these techniques: a development team or 
solo developer working to produce and support a software-based system.  
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6.3 Types of Programmer Discussed 
To bring the discussion to life, this chapter uses three ‘personas’: composite characters 
who illustrate the issues being described in the interviews. The use of personas is well 
established in software interaction design, as discussed by Pruit and Grudin [86].  
Microsoft has also used personas of software engineers [24]. Faily and Flechais [43] 
introduced their use in security research, creating the CAIRIS tool to create personas 
representing the security attitudes of software users. 
The personas described here are not real people, nor composite representations of the 
interviewees. Rather, they are typical of people described in the interviews, the people 
with whom the interviewees work. The personas are Jane Solo, Rob Youngcorporate and 
Jo Socialnetwork. 
6.3.1 Jane Solo 
Jane Solo is an example of an isolated programmer. Two of our interviewees (P1, P12) 
were themselves isolated programmers – though unusually security-aware ones – and this 
persona is based on their narratives and those who have worked with people in similar 
positions (P5, P9). Such programmers tend to be highly motivated to improve their skills, 
as found by Enes [40], but unaware of the issues around security and privacy. 
“It's not that [programmers] have passed judgement on [app security], and 
that it is unimportant – they just don't realise that it is important” (P5) 
Persona – Jane Solo 
Jane Solo is an experienced app programmer. She works on a contract basis, working 
sometimes on her own doing one-person projects for customers, sometimes working 
with teams of other app developers – either remotely from home or in their offices. Her 
projects tend to be technologically quite interesting: combining beacons with social 
media, for example, or creating NFC hand scanners for baggage operators. When she 
does not have contract work, she works on improvements to a game app she has 
produced and sells via the App Stores. 
Jane does not think much about app security in her projects. Her clients do not worry 
much about privacy or app misuse; they tend to be inexperienced in the app world and 
      55 
rely on experts like Jane to advise them. Jane reads about issues like the US Office of 
Personnel Management loss of personal details and the Edward Snowden affair, but 
knows they are the result of security leaks from large servers; she is not writing any 
server code, so they are not close enough to home for her to be concerned about them. 
She is, though, highly motivated to improve her skill; her career requires her to find 
new work often, and every relevant skill she can develop increases her saleability to 
new employers.  
Jane is unaware that her lack of interest in security could come with any costs. She does 
not know that her reuse of credentials in her game allows hackers to see all the players, 
along with sensitive information related to them. She does not know that the app she is 
producing for her employer collects credit card information in a way that can be seen 
by malware on the phone. Indeed it is unlikely either issue will cause her or her 
employer any embarrassment any time soon: even if credit card details are stolen it will 
take the card networks a long time to work out it was her app that allowed it. However 
Jane does care very much about her customers and about the people for whom she 
produces the apps – she is proud to be doing the best for them, and would not want to 
cause them any harm. 
6.3.2 Rob Youngcorporate 
Our second persona, Rob Youngcorporate, represents programmers working for 
companies with a significant software development capacity. Such companies may be 
aware of security issues around their commercial software generally, but will generally be 
unaware of the specific implications for app development.  
P6, P8, P9 and to some extent P10 were all discussing programmers in this kind of 
organisation. While the interviewees themselves have a strong understanding of security 
issues, many of the programmers they will have worked with and continue to work with 
are less well experienced, and may not have the resources and infrastructure to find out 
about security issues. 
Persona – Rob Youngcorporate 
Robert (‘Rob’) Youngcorporate works for a company that provides a traditional 
service: insurance. The company has looked at what the competition are doing, and 
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concluded they need an app. Robert is two years out of university and confident in his 
abilities and he’s happily taken on the learning task and the job of producing such an 
app. 
To get started, Rob produced a list of topics he would have to learn up to get started on 
the app. Naturally learning about mobile development languages and development 
environments came top of the list, and he’s read several books and been on a training 
course on the subject. He has also learned a great deal from his colleagues about the 
company’s systems and web APIs to which he will be integrating. However he also 
realised that for an app dealing in money there would be security implications. 
Accordingly he read the mobile OS manufacturer websites, and looked into the EMV 
standards for apps. This second line of investigation did not get him very far; EMV had 
not produced standards for apps at that time. So he read the OWASP web pages on the 
10 major app issues [120] instead . 
Rob believes he has ‘covered’ security for his app development. He does not know that 
he’s using one of the payment plugins in a way that causes it to log sensitive 
information to a file on the phone, nor that the PIN code he’s implemented for the login 
process would be open to a fairly simple brute force attack, allowing a phone thief to 
learn card payment details from the app. Rob cares about his company’s reputation, and 
certainly would not want such problems to become public knowledge; he would also be 
concerned about the effect on the individual users.  
6.3.3 Jo Socialnetwork 
Our third persona represents the minority of programmers working at organisations that 
are well aware of security and privacy implications and consider if part of their 
commercial offering. Both P3 and P11 work for companies similar to that described; P2 
and P7 work for other kinds of companies that are also very experienced in software 
security; and P5 built up a high level of security expertise in his organisation. The 
discussion of these interviewees was mainly about the best practice approaches they and 
their companies have developed. 
Yes, so [my company] has a strong culture of code review, nothing gets 
submitted without it being reviewed by at least another engineer. And there 
are strong processes to protect that fact. And there have been a number of 
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times when either in code review or design review, designs have come in, and 
I have been able to go 'Hang on a minute, look at this, or do that'. … And so 
catching those things in code or design review before they go out, so we don't 
reveal [damaging personal information] any more. It's the sort of thing that a 
security mentality helps with. (P3) 
Persona – Jo Socialnetwork 
Jo Socialnetwork works at a large social-networking company. The company has been 
around ten years or so and has millions of users, many of them paying. They have seen 
their competition stung by security and privacy breaches, and had one or two of them 
themselves. As a result, the company takes both software security and software privacy 
very seriously indeed. The company has a strong corporate culture, and all the 
programmers know ‘the way we do things here’: through discussions with colleagues, 
through documents, and through reviews and project retrospectives. Jo has been at the 
company over a year, and knows exactly what is expected by way of privacy and 
security.  
Every one of Jo’s projects starts with a review of possible security and privacy issues 
and a discussion of possible exploits that might be undertaken against it. Throughout 
the development Jo knows that she can at any time request a security review or express 
concerns about security issues, and these will be taken seriously and acted upon. She 
and her team are encouraged to think up potential problems, and rewarded for finding 
security and privacy defects. Before Jo's code is released, it will be reviewed by 
someone with experience of software security, to reduce the possibility of errors. 
However, these rarely happen at release time, because Jo, like her colleagues, has a 
good understanding of security issues, and she regularly calls upon colleagues if she is 
in any doubt.  
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6.4 The Techniques of Dialectical Security 
The following sections describe six techniques of Dialectical Security. The techniques 
are: 
Brainstorming the Enemy Ideation sessions working with stakeholders, 
penetration testing experts and others to derive possible 
attackers and attacks on the system 
Commercial negotiation Communicating security decisions in ways their 




Effective communication with other development teams 
to ensure security 
Security challenge Using professional and in-team security experts for 
code reviews and penetration testing 
Automated challenge Using automated tools to query possible security 
weaknesses 
Responsive development Gathering continuous feedback from the use of the 
system, and responding with continuous upgrades and 
interactive defenses. 
In mapping these techniques, we found that unlike many collections of software security 
patterns, such as Schumacher et al. [94], these do not break down as steps to be carried 
out as part of a process, nor do they form a hierarchy. Instead they characterise 
themselves in terms of the source of the challenge to the programming team: other team 
members; tools; other roles in the software development process; and end users and the 
consequences of end use. In each case, the dialectic can continue throughout the 
development cycle, and in each case it is always two-way: the increase in security comes 
from the interaction with the challenger, not from a passive understanding of the 
challenge. 
Figure 11 shows how the techniques relate to different counterparties to the development 
team. Ovals are the techniques; arrows show the most important interaction for each. The 
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illustration only identifies the key counterparties for each interaction; the other roles are 
involved in most of them: for example Trading Security Requirements would normally 
include project management and software architects as well. Note that in Brainstorming 
the Enemy the major source of the ‘dialectic’ challenge is from other team members; this 
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Figure 11: Techniques as dialectic interactions 
Note that we do not have evidence to claim these techniques are the best techniques for 
achieving security; however the statements of our interviewees certainly provide a strong 
indication that these are good and effective techniques. 
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7 Techniques of Dialectical 
Security 
This chapter explores each of the six techniques of Dialectical Security as sections 7.1 
through 7.6, discussing when each is suitable and how it is carried out, and illustrating 
each with examples using the developer personas.  





“One of the things I like to do with the [penetration testing] guys is to, if you 
sit down and say 'what are all the different ways you could subvert this 
system'. It is quite common to come up with 20, 30, 40, 50 in five or ten 
minutes of brainstorming. I bet you, you wouldn't think of half of them.” (P2)  
7.1.1 Example 
Jo Socialnetwork recently started a new project with her team, implementing an 
enhancement to the payments collection functionality to support payments via PayPal. 
As she started, she realised she has a problem: how can the team implement security if 
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they do not know against what they are protecting? So as they started the project, one of 
the first things they set up was a half-day session with the team, penetration testers, the 
product manager and a representative from PayPal to understand what the attackers 
might be, their motivations, what they might be after and how they might typically get 
it. Of course, they had the lists of similar considerations from earlier implementations 
of the payment collection functionality and they used them for reference. Based on 
these lists they brainstormed a new list of possible attacks on the new system.  
7.1.2 Exploration 
Any system can be broken with sufficient determination, ingenuity and resources.   
Every security system can be broken. Period. There are even ways of getting 
the certificates off a phone, by freezing the phone and reading the memory. 
There is nothing you can do to stop a truly determined person to getting in, 
short of dropping it into a nuclear furnace. The best you can do is make it 
difficult enough for them, that they will lose interest – that it's not worth the 
trouble. (P7) 
I quickly realised that no system is ever unbreakable (P9) 
Secure app development is therefore not a matter of making a completely secure system. 
Instead it becomes a question of which defences to put in; where one should spend the 
time and effort defending the system to deter the largest and most damaging potential 
exploits. Making those choices requires an understanding of the potential attackers: 
I think it is actually very important to understand the motivations behind why 
somebody is hacking the system. We try to address the motivations of the 
attackers, versus the technical aspects - just locking it down for the sake of 
locking it down. (P11) 
It also requires an understanding of what attacks they might make: 
I think the things that are the most challenging around security really are 
trying to understand the threat landscape and trying to understand how 
threats are realised. (P2). 
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Thinking about: where could this go wrong? That is the thing the people just 
coming out of university don't understand, don't think about is what are the 
attack points of this particular code, what are the failure points, even more 
than attack points, because anything is an attack point. (P7) 
Neither attacker profiles not attack descriptions, however, are conventional knowledge 
for an app developer. So how do they best obtain them? 
7.1.3 Solution 
Identify both attackers and possible exploits in two steps. The first step is to create 
profiles of likely attackers. This means querying experience with similar products, 
discussing with others in the industry, and consulting experts. The attackers may not be 
the obvious ones: 
There are clear reasons why someone would want to attack a bank, but 
actually the real reasons for attacking a bank are very seldom to do with 
trying to get financial rewards. It is much more around what information you 
can get about people. Banks hold information about people. So [it might be] 
a private investigator who is trying to track someone, or a hostage situation, 
where people might have done things, or simply learning more about 
behaviour. (P9) 
The second step is to use brainstorming sessions for attack profiling.   
I was involved in a lot of conversations about trying to think about doing 
really evil things, so I think in order to protect people from harm we have to 
think about how harm can be done. So, brain-storming bad intent is part of 
the life, really. (P5) 
These brainstorming sessions include people with different roles, especially testers, 
penetration testers, app security code reviewers and security specialists. An excellent 
concise recipe for running them is in the seminal work on negotiation, Fisher et al.’s 
‘Getting to Yes’ [44], whose chapter ‘Invent Options for Mutual Gain’ contains a step-
by-step prescription for an effective brainstorming process.  
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Particularly with development teams using agile approaches, this ideation process 
continues informally throughout the initial development project, and into the subsequent 
deployment and later lifetime of the product. The most security-capable teams included 
attacks and motivations found in the course of deploying the app, or afterwards.   
The other thing, is … [to] reward proactive thinking and this is two levels of 
that: trying to think what could happen next, how could it go wrong, what am 
I missing, but then the next level of reward, is rewarding people for research.  
And thinking about how to do harm.  Actively encourage them to think like a 
hacker. (P5) 
7.1.4 Discussion 
Even an apparently innocuous product may be under threat: 
The only question is 'are you, as a target, worth it?’ So, that then becomes 
very much the entire world's permutations of life, because you might be 
selling flowers, why would you be a hacking target. Well, if it is a spotty 
faced teenager wanting to know whether his girlfriend has had flowers 
delivered that he didn't send, then you have information, and now there is a 
reason. (P9) 
There are tools available which may help 
Microsoft have a threat modelling tool, which they make freely available, and 
it is actually a really nifty thing that you can draw a data flow diagram of 
your system and it provides a framework where you can think about what are 
the security implications of this bit of flow and this interface and what are the 
other security domains. (P6) 
Of course the degree of formality and effort involved depends entirely on the context. A 
solo app developer considering the privacy implications for a new game need not 
probably worry about a very formal approach; a development team producing a social 
network extension for a banking application will need a formal documented record of the 
threat motivations, personas involved, identified potential exploits. Moreover, the latter 
will need to be correlated in due course with the proposed risk analysis and mitigations 
and extended throughout the lifetime of the product. 
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There has been some work studying the use of brainstorming sessions in software. Shih et 
al. [95] looked at the use of brainstorming at Microsoft, and highlight some of the 
problems to avoid. Dashti and Basin’s paper on Security Testing [32] describes a process 
of finding possible security exploits, which reads similarly to this Brainstormed Profiles 
technique.  
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For businesses it is a risk based approach which they need to understand and 
neither [management nor programmers] should be caring about actual nitty 
gritty details of coding which is just an artefact of the whole thing. (P6) 
7.2.1 Example 
Once Jo Socialnetwork had the list of issues from her first Brainstorming the Enemy 
workshop, she found the team could have enough work implementing mitigations to 
keep them working well past the planned product delivery date. 
That clearly was not acceptable, so she and the team then used the profiles of the 
attackers and her team’s experience to estimate how likely each exploit might be, and 
the possible impact to the company of each. This required discussion with the product 
manager, security and risk specialists and occasionally more senior management; and 
as a result they decided to ignore some of the identified issues altogether. For the 
remainder, the development team then had sessions thinking up a variety of possible 
‘mitigations’ to implement for each risk, and estimating the effectiveness and 
development cost for each. 
Jo then discussed the list of attacks, impacts and possible mitigations with the product 
manager. Based on that, the product manager and senior management then made 
calculated risk-based decisions comparing the ‘value’ of each mitigation to their 
business against the value of other enhancements: functionality, performance and the 
like. Since they use an agile development process, the implementation of the 
‘mitigations’, where these were in code, was included in the product backlog to be 
implemented in due priority order relative to work. As the project continued, and the 
team identified further possible attacks and mitigations based on feedback from testers, 
users and others, these too were prioritised based the associated risks.  
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7.2.2 Exploration 
Merely identifying the possible attackers and exploits does not of itself deliver app 
software security. The need is to prevent them causing significant damage to users, 
stakeholders or others. To achieve that, a development team takes the list of possible 
attacks, and work out possible mitigations for each. These mitigations will each have 
costs in development time, commitment, finance and sometimes usability. The team can 
estimate financial and other costs for each. However the decision of what aspects of 
security to implement is a commercial one. Implied in every decision about software 
security is a trade-off of the cost of the security against the benefit received. Every 
security enhancement needs to be weighed against other uses of the investment (financial, 
time, usability) required. For example, 
[Costly development approaches aren’t] suitable for a lot of start-ups. And 
the same goes for security. You’re going to have to make a security decision 
upfront. (P1) 
How, then, do the developers make the decision which security enhancements to 
implement? 
7.2.3 Solution 
Interpret the security risks and costs to stakeholders (project managers, senior 
management, customers) in terms they can understand and use to prioritise security 
concerns against other organisation and project needs. 
[When I started] a project I’d go back and ask [the customer]…‘You do 
realise this [information] can be seen’. It goes from there: ‘how secure do 
you want it to be?’ You have to show that there’s a problem first I think” 
(P1) 
It is hard to over-emphasise the value of such interpretation. Many of our interviewees 
made the point that ‘security is not an absolute’ – security is what the users and 
stakeholders need for a particular situation at a particular time. For such stakeholders to 
make a good decision on what they require requires particularly effective communication. 
The stakeholders will be making cost benefit trade-offs comparing various business risks. 
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You've got to put a weighting on the threat.  You've got a level of threat, and 
you've got to put the appropriate level of security against that. (P4) 
There are techniques available to give objective assessment of security risks, such as 
work by ben Othmane et al. [80]. Vitally – and several interviewees stressed this – the 
cost-benefit trade-offs mean that perfect security, even if possible, would rarely be a good 
business decision: 
And actually the way this works, in practice is you have to do less than a 
perfect job, in order to have a measureable degree of failure or fraud or 
whatever, so that you can adjust your investment and say ‘I am managing 
this to an economically viable level’ because if it is zero, you have invested 
too much. (P6) 
For simpler projects and systems, there may not be sufficient engagement from 
stakeholders to be able to do this kind of trade-off; in that case it becomes the 
responsibility of the developer: 
[Often it’s impossible to get signoff on security in a big company and so the 
decision is usually down the developer because you can’t get the signoff. And 
in a small company may just be the same]. Customers often don’t have a 
view. The important thing is making the decision. (P1) 
Given that each mitigation now has a cost and benefit, the decision on whether to do it 
becomes part of standard project management process. It is outside the scope of our 
theory – and indeed of the topic of software security – to explore how these decisions are 
made; the balancing of risk cost and reward is a well understood aspect of business life. 
And it has to be a bit of a trade off as well in terms of business. You’ve got to 
make the trade off as to what’s good for getting a solution available now, and 
having one available in a year’s time, which no one will buy, because 
everyone’s gone with one which doesn’t even consider security at all. (P12) 
There has to be a system level thinking going on about where you do certain 
things and might not do certain things but you ultimately have to think [like a 
risk manager] (P5) 
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7.2.4 Discussion 
Interpreting a threat to a non-programmer involves putting it in terms that are meaningful 
for them: 
I think you normally phrase it along; you do realise this [information] can be 
seen. It goes from there: how secure do you want it to be. You have to show 
that there’s a problem first I think, that’s how it’s phrased. This particular bit 
of data at the moment, at the way it’s going to be implemented, a certain kind 
of person would be able to see that. Are you happy with that? From there you 
go to what other data is there. (P1) 
It is important to use language that is appropriate to the problem; phrases like “it’s 
insecure” can actually hinder, not help, communication: 
Half the time you're going to be a bit careful about what you say because 
obviously if you say something like 'the keys are insecure' – meaning insecure 
from the point of view of some FIPS attacker – then you are going to freak 
out somebody who is just trying to install a lock on a bike shed. So I think you 
have to get the right perspective there. The threat level and the information 
level, and again, I don't really want to hide anything, the number of things 
I've seen go pear shaped because somebody has said something stupid like 
'it's insecure'. (P4) 
Estimating the probability of a threat can be surprisingly straightforward, in the 
experience of the author [108]. One estimates as ‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’ for both the 
probability of each exploit, and also for its likely impact. Though crude, this gives 
sufficient information to reason about the attacks. For example, if one is creating a game 
app, it is unlikely that the hacking departments of major nation states are going to be 
especially interested (unless you’re building Angry Birds, perhaps). So the probability of 
sophisticated attacks is low. 
Within simpler projects, the act of thinking through mitigations may itself be valuable 
even without negotiation: 
I certainly wouldn’t go as far as saying that everything I’ve done is 
absolutely [or even] sufficiently secure… It’s that for the most part I’ve got 
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an idea of what the risks are so if there is something which starts to need 
mitigating, I can think about mitigating rather than [it being an open 
problem]. (P12) 
The discussion of the value of implementing a mitigation needs to take into account that 
some are more effective than others are. Mitigations handling general problems are more 
valuable than fixes for specific issues; P11 provided an interesting overview of how his 
team approaches the problem:  
And basically our team has four primary goals [for mitigations]: exploit 
mediation: we try to make it so that even if there is a bug that you can't do 
anything bad with the bug; exploit containments, so we recognise that people 
are going to get through our mitigations so let's try to make sure that that is 
appropriately contained; attack surface reductions, so from a security point 
of view, if you can't reach the code, well there could be a bug but it is 
useless; and probably more relevant here to application developers, safe by 
default settings so we make it that you have to go out of your way to 
introduce a security hole. (P11) 
P11 also pointed out that the solution to a security weakness need not be in software: 
And the analogy I use all the time is: if you look at the world, you and I are 
both vulnerable to Ebola; we are not immune to it. If you were exposed to 
Ebola, you would get infected by it. So you have a security vulnerability; you 
have a medical vulnerability; I have a medical vulnerability. Yet the medical 
industry and the newspaper industry and the press don’t go about publishing 
articles that say 100% of population is vulnerable to Ebola. And why? 
Because the medical industry has concepts of quarantine and are able to 
control populations, control the propagation of diseases. They have defence 
in depth; they have for certain diseases like smallpox this concept of an 
inoculation, a shot. (P11) 
Indeed many organisations approach the subject of risk (of which security risk is one 
aspect) as a discipline in its own right: 
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Have you ever worked with a risk manager, a really good corporate risk 
manager? … These guys are part mathematician, part bookie, part 
process/problem solver (P5). 
One approach to expressing risk in a way that is useful and meaningful to stakeholders is 
to express it in terms of whether the risk is increasing or decreasing – an approach used 
by William Brandon, currently CISO of the Bank of England [121]. One can speculate 
that this works because stakeholders usually have a view of the current risk levels as 
acceptable or unacceptable, and can therefore reason about the results of them improving 
or worsening. 
It is important to remember that this is about the calculated estimate of risk. The fact that 
an unlikely bad event subsequently happens would not invalidate a decision not to 
mitigate against it. The original decision would only be ‘bad’ if it was based on sloppy 
information gathering or faulty thinking.  
[Following the decision to ignore a risk], the important thing was that you 
pointed out the risk first, so when it happened you just go 'yes, it was a 
commercial decision, move on'. It is in your risk log, and it is agreed upon – 
it is understood. (P8) 
One aspect of Negotiated Security is that it may turn out to be appropriate sometimes not 
to pay for security; unsurprisingly the total need for security may turn out to be less than a 
purist security expert would expect. Equally it is important to present the security budget 
as a positive aspect:  
There is a budget for security that every company must have – that budget 
has to include resources that a hard core manager would say are stolen from 
you, a more enlightened manager would say 'it's the tax on not being 
attacked'. Giving those resources to your attackers and playing the game, 
you have got to keep them amused, you can't just give them to them; they 
want a reward of some sort, they are after something, so you have to play the 
game with them. But that is the cost, that is your budget, and there is an 
element of network capacity, there is an element of disc space, there is an 
element of servers, there is an element of security specialists, there are the 
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managers and the monitors. All of that around, that is part of your budget for 
security, if you don't have that, you are going to fall foul of hacking. (P9) 
Finally there are some perverse incentives against security, highlighted by P6, which 
begin to give some idea why software security is often seen as less important than one 
might expect: 
George Akerlof is a Nobel Prize winning economist, and he wrote a paper in 
1970 called The Market for Lemons [4], and what he was talking about was 
used cars in America. So, you buy a used car and it could be a peach – little 
old lady drives it to church on Sundays, or it could be a lemon, which is 
going to go wrong next week, and the consumer cannot tell the difference. So 
the economic consequences of that, is that, as a vendor, you keep the 
peaches, because you can tell the difference, …and you sell the lemons, and 
over time, the consumer comes to expect more and more lemons, so they are 
willing to spend less and less, so it ends up being a race to the bottom. So if 
there is some product attribute that the consumer cannot measure, you tend 
to get less of it over time because there is no economic incentive to keep 
putting it in. And security, sadly, has a lot of that aspect. If I buy a product 
off the shelf, I can't say “that one’s got security and that one hasn't” So I'm 
just going to pay the value of the one that hasn't. And therefore there is no 
economic incentive for the manufacture of that product to build in any extra 
security, because it's not going to get them any more sales. (P6) 
Moreover the straightforward commercial incentives are not always as clear cut as some 
security proponents might suggest: 
I looked and again there is anecdotal received wisdom that lots of companies 
have gone out of business because of security breaches, and it is just not true. 
I found two, only two, ever, that I could find that had gone out of business 
due to security breaches and one of them was DigiNotar who were in the 
security business. They were a certificate authority, so they clearly did go out 
of business when their fundamental offering was broken. And the other one 
was … an ISP in the USA, and … they were attacked and their business was 
entirely based around Amazon web services and the attackers compromised 
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their keys – basically wiped everything they had on Amazon web services, 
and they had no other back up of their system – so it completely destroyed the 
company. It was bad computer security yes, but the fundamental thing that 
put them out of business was that they didn't have any backups. (P6) 







And I think, … [what was very successful was] around even [specific security 
issues and mitigations] – the working incredibly closely as a team, and just 
having very open discussions with cards on the table and removing the fear 
around discussing aspects of security which, I often find in project meetings, 
people don't want to bring up because they feel they don't want to expose 
their own domain. (P8) 
7.3.1 Example 
Rob Youngcorporate had identified several security issues he knew his product would 
need to handle. He knew he would need an authentication process for each user starting 
using the app, and some form of ‘quick authentication’ thereafter. He knew there would 
be a risk of ‘Man in the Middle’ (MITM) attacks on the app’s communication with his 
insurance company’s back end services.  
So he discussed the problems and the potential security attacks he had identified with 
the User Experience team, and worked with them to identify a suitable way to give the 
user this ‘quick authentication’ by comparison with similar apps (banking, for 
example). He also talked a good deal with the implementers of the back end services, 
agreeing HTTPS-based secure protocols and helping them prevent ‘brute force’ attacks 
such as trying thousands of possible passwords for a given user. 
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7.3.2 Exploration 
Many security issues span a number of teams: development teams, operations and even 
marketing or publicity. Thus there is a frequent danger that security problems can ‘fall 
between two stools’, remaining ignored because two teams each think the other is 
responsible for the problem. 
The problem is exacerbated if the development team are not natural communicators: 
I had a core technology group … who worked for me, and these guys were 
double firsts in maths from Cambridge. Incredibly bright guys: appalling 
interpersonal skills. (P5) 
And sometimes by organisational politics: 
You get teams of people who are perhaps very protective of their platforms, 
because they own the system and they are master of the system, and they 
want it to be seen as a golden system… Quite often the people representing 
the system are perhaps one step removed from the real hands-on techies – 
they are generally a manager, who ultimately becomes associated with this 
platform and they feel that their role can be at risk if that platform was ever 
to be undermined and another platform selected over it, so they wouldn't, by 
default, become the owner of that system, so the silos become self-reinforcing 
but it is very difficult sometimes to know whether you have actually been 
delivered all the facts. (P8) 
And also if teams are effectively separated by time – they’re not working on the project at 
the same time: 
[There is a big] difference between the operational and project approaches. 
[And security is the one real thing that is not going to get handled by that 
handover]. That is a real challenge. (P8) 
7.3.3 Solution 
Ensure frequent and open communication on security problems in any way available. 
Bringing members of the different teams together on a social basis encourages that kind 
of communication: 
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I am a strong believer in the social aspect of it… I think if you can bring 
people together physically on a regular basis so that you can get to the stage 
where people are discussing family, friends with each other and everything 
else, it breaks down a lot of the artificial barriers that are there. … I do think 
co-location was key, and we would regularly come together, we would share 
a whiteboard and we all had the same view of the world. Openness and 
transparency - I think it makes a huge difference. I really do. (P8) 
So does encouraging informal communication on technical issues: 
 [Of a successful project] I guess we were working with a team who were 
experienced but also everybody who was close to the project, lived through 
the project life cycle to delivery, were very comfortable picking the phone up 
to anybody else and discussing any aspect, and everyone reported back quite 
openly what they were seeing when we came together. (P8) 
An effective but very different form of communication is the more formal documentation 
of responsibilities. One straightforward way to do this is a ‘Security scope’ document that 
identifies the security responsibilities of a given team. That highlights where ‘falls 
between two stools’ problems may happen, and is used, for example, in a secure 
development process introduced by the author [108].  
Where multiple organisations are involved, this may even be contractual:  
We have got in our contract with [our development company] a definitive list 
of things that they will have failed to do their job if they haven't protected 
against these types of attacks. When we find a new one, we try to write a test 
for it, we put it into the document (P5) 





Pen testers  
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“Nothing gets submitted without it being reviewed by at least another 
engineer. And there are strong processes to protect that fact. … The most 
successful technique has to be review by [a security] expert – you can't really 
beat that – an actual conversational review by an expert, because someone 
who is an expert in security might not be an expert in the domain.” (P3) 
7.4.1 Example 
Jo Socialnetwork knows how to ensure good security with her code. It is built into the 
very processes and mentality she and her colleagues use in their development. 
First, any time that she or any of her colleagues may have a concern about a security or 
privacy issue, she knows anyone can flag it to the project manager who must almost 
immediately set up a review with the appropriate people from the security team. 
Secondly a lot of her work is pair programming, and she and her ‘pair’ continually ask 
each other questions, including questions about security; just as they help and remind 
each other to handle all of the aspects of code – especially security and privacy. 
Finally there is a lot at stake for the company, so she knows that, as part of the release 
process, all of the changes she produces will be reviewed by a separate security team 
before they are made live. 
7.4.2 Exploration 
It is notoriously difficult to spot one’s own errors – c.f. Meyers’ Principle 2 of Software 
Testing [73]. This is especially true when the errors are faults in complex reasoning, or 
are due to misunderstandings. A programmer working solo is likely to create avoidable 
security problems, just because they can naturally have only one point of view. 
So it is very easy when you are trying to deliver something yourself, as a 
developer, to pass over the bit that you are not doing (P5) 
This problem extends to programming teams; a team, too, will always to some extent 
suffer from ‘groupthink’; the need to generate a shared understanding brings with it the 
danger that that understanding may include misunderstandings and blind spots.   
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7.4.3 Solution 
Set up the development so that each has another person or team with a different viewpoint 
challenging the security and privacy aspect of assumptions, decisions and code. 
There are several common ways of arranging this within a typical development process: 
pair programming, security review, code review and penetration testing. 
Although not normally cited as a security technique, Pair Programming gives the 
developer the benefit of external questioning; it also enables a programmer to handle 
more complexity during the programming process; two people can keep track of more 
issues than one. 
Two heads are better than one, more eyes on the problem. (P7) 
A security review of the design, technologies and protocols of a system, by an 
experienced secure software expert, is particularly effective, and also helps developers to 
learn more of their code base [90]. 
There is a separate Security Review system, so if you are doing code that 
impacts security in your judgement, it goes to people who are security 
experts who will do the security review and they find stuff. … And anyone 
involved can say, ' this needs a security review' – it might be the product 
manager, who is representing the user, it might be one of the software 
engineers who is writing the stuff, it might be one of the code reviewers who 
is reviewing the software. (P3) 
Sophisticated organisations may even separate the security and privacy concerns 
completely: 
There are also Privacy Review Processes …. And again you go to Privacy 
Review, and they say 'representing the user and their control of data, should 
we release this?’ (P3) 
For a cloud-based system, the widely accepted way of ensuring security is Penetration 
Testing, where an external ‘white hat’ security team simulates what an attacker would do 
to attempt to gain access or disable the service. They then feed any ‘successful’ exploits 
they have found back to the development and operations teams.   
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[Ensuring that the teams that I’m working with produce secure software] 
tends to get handed off, in most companies I've worked with, to a white-hat 
hacking team. [They] don't do it at a code level. (P7) 
At the operating system level, one can also penetration test a mobile device: 
“I think the one [approach] that has been, arguably, most useful has been 
using specialist external consultancy around security. Not for training, but 
‘can you just come in and penetration test this device’” (P2) 
The widely used equivalent of penetration testing for an app is an external security code 
review. Many companies now specialise in this kind of app security code review; they 
gather lists of known security issues found in apps, with mitigations for each, and then 
review the provided code to look for those security issues. Security code reviews are also 
very effective when internal to a company: 
Code review is what we do endlessly. We certainly do not let any form of 
code out the door, without an independent review and that is eyeballs on the 
code and that is discussion about the code (P5) 
We do code reviews as much as possible. And I point out when I think 
something may have some issues, things like that. (P7) 
All of these approaches are expensive; there is a significant resource cost to providing the 
challenge. In the case of pair programming, research suggests that the net cost is 
relatively small [25].  The other three interventions all represent additional costs for an 
organisation, however, which need to be traded against the corresponding benefits: 
You call them out, but ultimately [best] is code level reviews but again it is 
this balance between the ideal world and the timescale, versus the risk and 
the consequences of the risk, or the consequences of an attack (P7) 
Because of the need for the involvement of other people Security Challenge does not 
usually make sense for solo programmers, or those working in organisations that do not 
take security seriously. 
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7.4.4 Discussion 
Penetration testing in particular has significant limitations: 
I think what it struggles to address is the interpretation that comes about 
between a design and an implementation on potentially on the back end side 
of things. When you have got live systems that perhaps is already doing 
something broadly similar – maybe they will have the flow of request 
reversing – one system requests an address, then a phone number. Another 
may already have a piece of code written that requests a phone number and 
then an address. And it's a spurious example, but it shows how quite easily 
you may have specified these things in this order for a very good reason. And 
as far as you are aware, they are copying a design you have created, but 
actually somebody there sees an opportunity there to re-use something they 
have had sitting there for 5 years, and so calls that system [and thereby 
generated a security problem that Penetration Testing wouldn’t find]. (P7) 
Therefore it’s not always very effective commercially: 
You can do your penetration testing or your external testing as much as you 
like but actually it doesn't really tell you the likelihood of the next breach. 
(P6) 
P6 even suggested that Penetration Testing is likely to go out of fashion as the main 
approach: 
There are waves of approach to defending the security of computer systems, 
in fact anti-virus was the 1990's wave. Today's wave is definitely penetration 
testing and code inspection and all this kind of focusing on vulnerabilities 
and I think that’s a wave and it will have to be superseded by something else 
and in my view that something else has got to be about, essentially, about 
development processes. (P6) 
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P5 has an interesting approach to code security reviews, where two reviewers work 
together relatively informally: 
Every now and then, Joe and I will be looking at something in somebody's 
code, and I can see – and Joe loves his boys – and I love them as well, and 
girls, but his body language – he should never play poker with anybody – 
he'll be going through the code and he just pauses on the down button, just 
long enough – and I'll go 'what are you seeing?’ And he just looks at me and 
goes 'Well, I was just thinking about that'. (P5) 
There is a good deal of literature about code reviews generally. Recent studies include 
Baum et al.’s analysis of code review in industry [13], which stresses the importance of 
making reviews a part of the normal software development process. Rigby and Bird’s 
study [90] recommends in addition having two reviewers, making the reviews 
constructive with an emphasis on fixing problems, and doing the reviews as part of the 
release process. The OWASP Code Review Guide, a book [81], contains detailed 
discussion and recommendations how to carry out a security review.  




Dev and test tools
 
“[The most successful technique I have found is] to use various types of Lint 
checkers” (P7) 
7.5.1 Example 
Jane Solo does not worry much about app security, but she does care a good deal about 
the professionalism of her approach. One of the things she has discovered is that the 
error messages she gets from the normal compilation process are not very helpful in 
tracking down defects. She usually includes some additional checking tools in her 
development process to point out further defects that may be present. 
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As these checking tools are improving, she notices that some of the defects they are 
highlighting are in fact security defects. These lead her to wonder if there are other 
aspects of security that she might need to consider. 
7.5.2 Exploration 
Security Challenge can be very effective, but it is costly in human effort and impractical 
in many situations. Few solo app developers, for example, will have the money to pay for 
an external review of their code, or the social capital to persuade colleagues to do so. 
Likewise many organisations do not see value in paying for penetration testing or external 
reviewers, nor have skills to do either in-house.  
Equally, it is poor use of expensive resources to find problems that can be cheaply found 
elsewhere.  
How do we achieve this? 
7.5.3 Solution 
Use software tools to create dialectical challenges to the programmers. There are two 
areas where automation can help a great deal with the development of secure software. 
These are automated code analysis, and automated security testing. 
Automated code analysis acts as an extension to the compilation process of the code, and 
looks for possible security flaws in the written code. Tools to do this are sometimes called 
‘lint’ checkers, after a UNIX tool that does extra checking for C code. There are now 
many such tools, some produced by commercial companies, supporting different 
languages and purposes:  
We use something called Sonar [97] which is a code inspection tool we'd 
written templates and guides for our coding standards and certain patterns 
we are looking for in a code and we are looking for changes in the code that 
are greater than a certain percentage and there are specific bits of the code 
we are looking for any change that should never happen. (P5) 
They are excellent for looking for common errors: 
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One of the most common things, it is not as common in Java or Android, but 
anything using C or C++ - look for potential buffer overruns. And anything 
that has SQL Injections that do the same sorts of things: anything that can go 
outside of the expected bounds, that aren't being checked. And there are a 
number of Lint checkers that will pick up on that sort of thing. Use them! 
(P7) 
Increasingly some of the reviewing features are being migrated from independent tools 
into the compilers and default build processes for mobile software: 
So as tools get better, for both inspection and fixes, to say ‘hey this might be 
a security flaw’: as the compilers, as the development environment, whatever 
the tools are. Because even developers that are experts can make mistakes. 
And so the more the tools do like the code inspection review for you, for free, 
constantly, all the time, so you can't skip it, then yes, that will be a huge win. 
And I think that can instantly be improved in the two year time line. (P3) 
Though of course there is little value to such warnings if the programmer ignores them: 
Pay attention to the warnings, pay attention to the Link errors. [So it is not 
just the automated checks. It is the attitude towards those automated checks, 
taking them really seriously] Use them, don't forget them. (P7) 
The tools need to be carefully designed to make them easy to use; Johnson et al. have 
researched a set of recommendations what is required [58]: in particular the ability to 
avoid repeated false positives and support for ‘quick fixes’.  Others have created 
developer support tools for Android app code security analysis: Xie et al. [111] were first; 
Nguyen et al. [77] support the more widely-used IntelliJ development environment.. 
Automated security testing comes in two forms. First is the automation of manual tests 
that have or could find security defects as automated regression tests, to avoid the risk 
that such defects may recur: 
We added an entire section to [our automated testing suite] called 'Security', 
which is effectively hacking. We have built all form of vectored attacks 
against our platform – we endlessly think about ways to attack our platform. 
When we find a new one, we try to write a test for it. (P5) 
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However a second, recent, innovation is to use randomisation and ‘deep learning’ 
techniques to enable tests that would not necessarily occur to a human tester: 
I actually find that our fuzzing efforts, which you could view as a form of 
code analysis, have quite a bit more tangible results. The fuzzing effort 
doesn't happen at code review time, but happens at check in time; we have 
clusters of machines where we are doing attacks against the software that is 
checked in, and we are able to find [exploits] very quickly. (P11)  
This approach is likely to be enhanced as tools and techniques develop: 
So a deep learning system that actually understands security state machines 
that can look at code and not just see functionally what you are trying to do 
but have a look at the redundancy state machine, the security state machine, 
the parallelism and mass processing state machines, all those things as well. 
It can really help with actually saying ' you want a system to be like this but 
you don't really, you actually want your system to do this. And give you 
reasons why, as well. So that sort of guidance development, I think, is where 
we will be in the next 10 – 15 years. (P11) 
To get the best value, it is important to include both automated checks and automated 
testing as part of the fixed development process.  Best practice, given that they are 
automated, is to include them within the build cycle. 
Yeah, what we do is, [we have] a continual build system, every time someone 
checks in a change, we create a brand new version of [the system]. Once a 
day we snapshot that version … into our testing infrastructure, and for that 
entire day we are doing attacks against the code that is running on that 
device. So next day a new version …, and we continue attacks. And we will 
do that over and over again. (P11) 
7.5.4 Discussion 
There is an art to using a code inspection tool effectively. Often developers are 
intimidated by a large number of warnings, many of which turn out to be spurious, in that 
what they are highlighting is not likely to cause a security issue. The recommendation of 
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our interviewees was to work towards having a clean ‘compile’ such that only new 
problems show up. 
There is another big one: when you compile something and it spits out a 
whole bunch of warnings – don't ignore them! That is something I have been 
really against for years, and watching the compilation of [a huge system] 
and all the warnings that it spits out – really bugs the crap out of me. It is a 
big job because they have left it so long that there are so many of them, but if 
they would just sit down and look through each and every warning, either say 
'okay yes, I agree, it’s a valid warning, in this case I know what I'm doing, 
it’s okay so ignore it', or 'oh shit! I'd better take care of that!’ Get rid of all 
warnings. (P7) 
[And to do that you need something in the tools that makes it possible to 
suppress a particular warning.] In C or C++ you there is #pragma. In 
Android Java you can have a link to an XML file that turns off certain lint 
features and you can also suppress warnings inline for specific items. (P7) 
Others, however, amongst my interviewees took the view that such tools add little value 
to a well written code base: 
Traditionally, we haven't made strong use of Static Analysis tools. Static 
analysis tools have a reputation for being overly sensitive, and it’s hard to 
find issues. … I did an analysis of what [a commercial tool] found … I wasn't 
able to find a real security vulnerability in all the stuff …. Mostly because it 
was either unreachable, or there was corruption but the corruption was such 
that it was not attacker controlled. At the time I was actually somewhat pro 
code analysis tools until [this analysis] forced it upon me, and then I became 
very negative towards them. (P11) 
The economics of building code inspection tools is also a little problematic. It is not in 
human nature to want to be proved wrong, and programmers are typically unwilling to go 
to the effort to find money for tools that do so: 
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And critically [the industry needs] free automated tools. Paid tools are very 
hard to sell. How you get the economics right, so there is free automated 
tools end up out there is a hard problem. (P3) 
In practice, companies like SonarSource [97] typically make their revenue from services, 
rather than the tools themselves. 
Caution is needed with automated test tools, too. There is even a danger that an 
automated test suite, in the wrong hands, might itself become a threat: 
You know, the guy who runs my security testing piece has said 'do you realise 
what we have built?’ I said 'I absolutely know what we've built and that's why 
any execution of these is fully logged!’ (P5) 




Deployed software in use
 
I think one of the problems with remote devices is that these devices are 
intended to be robust against all attackers if you lose your device... And that 
makes it challenging from a forensic point of view to look into [issues] (P11)  
And the patches and updates basically what modern security is about – 
mistakes will be made and when the mistakes are found – how do you get the 
updates out? (P3) 
7.6.1 Example 
Jane Solo is planning her own personal app for the long-term. She knows she will need 
to change it and improve it, and that she will have defects to fix which will only appear 
in day-to-day activity by real users. To get feedback about those defects and enable her 
to take action, she puts in a good deal of logging. This uses standard third party 
libraries and back end services from companies that specialises in this. Using this 
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library Jane instruments our code to give her feedback on which features are used most, 
she will get crash reports with details of where and how the error occurred; and she puts 
in a pop-up to users who have used her game for more than two weeks to ask them for 
feedback. Actually, the pop-up is more sophisticated and positive feedback replies go to 
the App Store; negative feedback goes to Jane as author! 
The service itself ensures privacy, which will prevent Jane from getting some pieces of 
information that may be useful for tracking down bugs; Jane accepts this limitation in 
return for the convenience of using a well-made tool. 
Jane also knows that the development of her product will not end so long as the product 
is live. She will continue to receive feedback of problems – including security issues – 
that have been identified, and she realises that as time goes on, the environment around 
her product changes and attackers get more sophisticated, there will be new exploits 
that she will have to defeat. Therefore, she plans a long-term program of continued 
product development, with releases at regular intervals. If ever she needs to stop 
supporting this program, then she will explicitly withdraw the product. 
7.6.2 Exploration 
With servers and cloud-based software the process of ensuring security is continuous; 
typically operators and even management will be keeping a close eye on what is 
happening from a security point of view to the system, and be prepared to take active 
action as a result. 
I get an OSSEC [(an open-source monitoring system)] admin alert the minute 
anyone is trying to attack, and the great thing about OSSEC is it takes 
remedial action, moves them off, and we've got some other clever ideas we 
are thinking about. (P5) 
To keep apps secure also requires continuous feedback, both to detect actual exploits and 
to detect trends of use that may represent longer term threats. Getting such feedback is 
much more difficult with mobile apps than with servers. Not only are they not always 
connected, and under the control of someone else, but the devices are designed to be as 
impenetrable as possible: 
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 [The OS designers] want to make sure that no matter whatever privileged 
position you have, that these devices are impenetrable. That is the goal. 
(P11) 
Responding to such feedback is also a continuous process. New exploits, improved 
processing power and wider publication of existing exploits all mean that what might 
have been secure a year ago may not be now.  
Projects look at the risk here in their lifetime and you know the current risk 
and the current attack vectors, but they are constantly changing. (P8) 
It still is interesting to see how effectively security has a built in 
obsolescence. Even with SSL security, which is obviously almost the bottom 
level. (P12) 
The problem is not just increasing attack sophistication of attacks; changes to the 
supporting environment often have security implications requiring changes to apps to 
support them: 
Obviously given the rate at which Apple and Google are changing Android 
and IOS and all the other things, just keeping still is difficult. (P12) 
However the nature of app development ‘contracts’, whether internal to a company or 
commercial external contracts is often ‘fire and forget’. 
[Most companies developing apps] treat the creation of what they do akin to 
building motorways or something – it's a project to deliver something, but 
that something is then just passed off to the highway authority for them to sit 
there and monitor the traffic flow on it, but aren't necessarily concerned that 
the bridge structure may not be up to the ever increasing amount of traffic 
that is passing over it right now. (P8) 
On completion of the initial app development phase, the development team is normally 
allocated to different projects. 
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Like many things that get delivered in a project, the project ends and interest 
dies with it. Unfortunately. And I think you lead into a significant challenge 
in securing things on an operational basis. (P8) 
This makes it very hard to pull together an ad-hoc team to solve even serious issues: 
Technology is constantly changing but to bring together the spotlight or the 
focus on a live service, unless it has reached the stage that is it almost 
headline news, is very difficult to do because the effort required in creating a 
project in the first instance, to bring together the bodies and the budget for 
most businesses is enormous. So the day to day behaviour doesn't allow for 
the ‘dipping into things’. (P8) 
Even given the development teams to analyse and fix software, ensuring that updates 
reach the users can also be a problem; many users do not enable automatic upgrades.  
The moment you release something to an Android phone, you will, in general, 
never get a 100% update rate, because loads of people update software once 
and never update. (P3) 
7.6.3 Solution 
Instigate a long-term development approach to support both security monitoring and 
regular updating. To achieve this, developers must find specific ways both to monitor 
feedback from the apps and to ensure the delivery of updates; and project stakeholders 
need to ensure that projects have a continuous long-term support and monitoring 
elements.   
App feedback usually requires explicit functionality: 
I’ve built quite a bit into the Apps where they have their own debug logs 
because I don’t trust the likes of Google because they have to sanitise what 
they give you because they’ve got privacy issues on their side of things. 
Because we have more of a direct relationship with our users, we can get 
more information and we have them direct to our systems, so effectively 
there’s a low level of logging, logging things which are going wrong. (P12) 
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Typically this is not limited to security-based feedback, but can be enhanced to deliver 
security based information. 
I must admit, most of the logging I tend to do is logging exceptions, well 
exceptions to the rule rather than Java exceptions:  something funny has 
happened here, so you can say ‘something’s funny happened’ (P12) 
Turning to the issue of acting upon the feedback, we identified two kinds of change a 
team needs to handle: longer term strengthening, and emergencies. The first requires 
regular releases of new software versions and a continuous resource to do so: 
Part of my team’s job is to make sure that the security issues that happen 
today, we eliminate them. There will be security issues that happen 
tomorrow, but they will be a different set of security issues. (P11) 
The second is an ‘emergency’, where a new exploit becomes public and the product needs 
an upgrade before one of the large number of unsophisticated (‘script kiddie’) attackers 
manages to use it on instances of the product: 
What worries me more is script kiddies and things like that, because when 
you get a zero day exploit released and I must admit, that is the one time 
when I jump as quickly as possible because I think, if someone’s just released 
an open SSL loophole or something, you can pretty much guarantee that 
within 24 hours someone will be probing every system they can find on the 
internet and they’ll be breaking in. And that’s not because they’re coming 
after you personally. (P12) 
Getting the resource to do this requires a long-term approach to product development, 
since there will be costs long after the first release. Typically companies decide to 
maintain for a limited time and then explicitly stop security updates: 
It involves engineering resource to do the … updates across every product. 
What we have said is that the current, the products that are currently in this 
three year window [are maintained] so not everything [we have produced], 
but the current products, we will keep them up to date. (P3) 
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Organisations taking this long-term attitude will use development contracts (‘maintenance 
contracts’) and system architectures that allow for this rather than the more traditional 
‘fire and forget’ approach. 
7.6.4 Discussion 
Programmer feedback from live systems is an area where security and privacy needs can 
conflict.  From a security point of view, it is valuable to have as much information as 
possible delivered back to the programmer.  However from a privacy point of view it is 
not desirable to store personally identifiable information anywhere where it is not 
essential for the user’s needs. The simplest solution is to limit any code that creates the 
log entries, ensuring privacy-sensitive information is never logged at all. However this 
can conflict with debugging using test data: a programmer will want to see identifiable 
aspects of the test data in the logs. Therefore, another approach the author has used is to 
use structured log messages that identify sensitive data within the log messages, and to 
have the logging system remove the sensitive data only in the live system. 
For mobile apps the upgrading process is usually straightforward for the developer; the 
‘app store’/’play store’ and similar support relatively secure upgrading: 
From my experience of being involved in both, not as a coder, but just being 
around the technology: [an advantage that apps have is] the fact that you 
can distribute an application through a trusted channel, with a high degree 
of confidence that is still going to be there in its intended form. (P8) 
However, as discussed above, there is a particular problem of ensuring that users upgrade 
to the new version. For iOS users this is typically not a major issue; anecdotal evidence 
suggests that typically 80% of users have upgraded most apps within three weeks [87].  
However Android upgrade rates are slower; many users do not enable automatic 
upgrading – through ignorance, or because upgrading sometimes causes issues for apps. 
App statistics on this are hard to come by, but Thomas et al. obtained figures on the 
upgrades of the Android OS [103], finding: 
Within 30 days of the first observation of a new version on a device, half of 
all devices of that model have the new version … installed, and within 324 
days 95% of devices have the new version. (Thomas et al.) 
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A common solution, implemented in several cases by the author, where the apps 
communicate with a server controlled by the app owner is ‘forced upgrades’ based on the 
app version number. This requires extra support in the app and server: on start-up the app 
interrogates the server for the minimum version currently supported; if the app’s current 
version is less, it refuses to run, and instead directs the user to the appropriate view in the 
‘store’ app to make the upgrade. 
Upgrading also carries with it its own security risks; the team will need to analyse these 
along with other risks: 
There is a whole notion of trusted distribution as well, which is still very 
pertinent but which people have forgotten about. (P6) 
So when you update the firmware in a phone, technically speaking, you are 
attacking the phone. So there is a verification process involved there. (P2) 
Samsung had a massive problem with having their update mechanism open. 
So if you plugged a Samsung TV into your network and you are monitoring to 
find out Samsung connections, you could quite happily hack Samsung TVs 
globally. So that becomes a back door into your domestic network, an entry 
point, and away you go. (P10) 
If you do not have forced upgrades implemented, the need to support older versions of the 
app can become a major security issue since the whole system is only as strong as its 
weakest link: 
I must admit, that’s difficult because you’ve got the risk of downgrade attacks 
with security, so if you have system which doesn’t use https, so you start off 
using http and then you put https in, you’ve got to be wary about turning it 
on, because there might be, it might not work. And if you’ve got a big user 
base, the last thing you want to find out is, you’ve just knackered half your 
user base. [So you need to be able to turn it on gradually] But the problem 
with that is that, because if you’ve got the ability to turn it on, a threat is the 
ability to turn it off and work around it, so you have to treat that as a 
transitory thing: you get to a stage where you have got everyone running 
secure and then you’ve got to disable the [http version]. (P12) 
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There is also a range of architectural issues associated with upgrading, especially related 
to rollback and API versioning: 
And also you cannot roll back perfectly. Because people don't take updates, 
but also because there is a corruption of user data issue going on, in that if, 
for example, someone installs Version 10 of the app, and modifies the local 
database to Version 10 format – if you try and roll back to Version 9, you 
might lose that data, and loose data protection, so rolling back is 
significantly harder in the mobile world. (P3) 
I must admit I did learn fairly quickly to make sure all your APIs are 
versioned properly so that [the code knows] when to fall back or reject them. 
And so you catch those things rather than it just falling over in a heap, 
because you’re trying to do something where it’s only got half the parameters 
and similar. (P12) 
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8 Conclusion and Future 
Work 
This chapter summarises the Dialectical Security techniques, explores parallels to existing 
literature, and discusses the contrast with both the patterns literature and conventional 
process-based approaches. It then reviews the experience of using Grounded Theory and 
examines how the findings of the study address the research questions introduced in 
Chapter 1, then explores threats to validity and possible future work to address them. 
Finally it discusses two areas for future research: exploring the techniques of Dialectical 
Security; and investigating a range of practical approaches to introduce them to 
developers. 
8.1 Summary of Dialectical Security 
Chapter 7 explored the experts’ knowledge related to the research question: 
RQ3 What are the most effective techniques to deliver app security? 
It introduced six techniques of Dialectical Security, introducing each one with a specific 
example, then expanding it as a more general problem, offering a general solution, and 
discussing related issues and practical approaches. Table 6 below summarises the 
techniques. 
      93 
Table 6: Summary of Dialectical Security Techniques 
 Technique Summary 
1. Brainstorming the 
Enemy 
Use ideation sessions with fellow programmers and others 
to identify both attackers and possible exploits in two steps 
2. Negotiated 
Security 
Interpret the security risks and costs to project stakeholders 
in terms they can understand and use to prioritise security 




Ensure frequent and open communication on security 
problems between development teams in any way available. 
4. Security Challenge Set up the development so that each has another person or 
team with a different viewpoint challenging the security 
and privacy aspect of assumptions, decisions and code. 
5. Automated 
Challenge 
Use automated code analysis, and automated security 
testing to create dialectical challenges to the programmers.  
6. Responsive 
Development 
Instigate a long-term development approach to support both 
security monitoring and regular updating of the apps.  
8.2 Discussion of Dialectical Security 
The ordering of these six techniques is roughly chronological from the point of view of 
the development team. While each is used repeatedly throughout the development cycle, 
developers will encounter the need for Brainstorming the Enemy and Negotiated Security 
earlier in each development cycle; and Responsive Development naturally comes rather 
later.  
8.2.1 Relationship to Existing Work 
We identified these techniques through the Grounded Theory process applied to our 
interview data; afterwards we found parallels in existing research, as follows.  
      94 
Comparing the existing work on app developers and security, section 3.4 identified 
valuable research on current practice by developers such as that by Balebako et al. [10]; 
this work goes further by identifying approaches for better practice. Much of the 
remaining literature we discussed is also valuable in the context of Dialectical Security as 
providing solutions to the challenges identified through dialectic. Thus an Android app 
programmer who is made aware of security issues from Brainstorming the Enemy, 
Security Challenge or Automatic would then be motivated to search for solutions on the 
web [120] or in practitioners’ literature such as ‘Android Security Internals’ [38]; work 
by Acar et al. suggests that their best choice would be the literature [2]. 
Considering the Dialectical Security techniques themselves, we suggest that two are 
reasonably well-understood and researched in various ways: Security Challenge and 
Automated Challenge. The techniques of Security Challenge of reviews and penetration 
testing are explored in detail in literature; Responsive Development is novel in the app 
development context, but the techniques of continuous response to security challenges are 
well-known within the context of server system management. McGraw’s book [68], for 
example, discusses all of these. For Automated Challenge, there is a considerable range 
of automated validation tools available even if, as found by Johnson et al. [58], these are 
currently not often used by developers. 
The other three techniques, Brainstorming the Enemy, Negotiated Security and Cross-
Team Security Discussion are less well reflected in existing security literature; section 8.7 
proposes approaches to research them. However they do have parallels in other aspects of 
software engineering. Brainstorming the Enemy relates to the HCI concept of ‘personas’ 
[86]; Negotiated Security relates in to the agile ‘Planning Game’ technique [14]; and 
Cross-team Security Discussion relates to the large amount of work available on 
collaboration between distributed teams [20]. 
An important piece of related work, published after the main work of this thesis, is by 
Ashenden and Lawrence [9]. They used an Action Research approach to investigate and 
improve the relationships between security professionals and software developers. The 
Action Research approach has considerable potential, and the work suggests an important 
further ‘dialectical technique’ (surprisingly, one not mentioned by our interviewees) in 
the interaction between programmers and security professionals themselves. 
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8.2.2 From Processes to Dialectic Cultures 
Section 1.1 identified that existing literature contains little about the team interactions 
required to achieve software security. The Dialectical Software techniques by contrast 
constitute a way of working, almost an attitude to working, for developers who need to 
deliver secure software. They are completely consistent with, and incorporate the thinking 
of, much existing literature, but extend it to provide immediate day-to-day help to 
developers. 
Where they differ from existing literature is in their implied approach to team 
organisation. Secure Development Processes like Microsoft’s [69] provide a series of 
steps and deliverables for a team to carry out. Dialectical Software instead provides a set 
of attitudes to development teamwork and approach, and therefore meshes more 
effectively with self-organising teams [53].  
Because it is interactive, and an attitude of mind more than a formal method that needs to 
be followed, we propose that Dialectical Security will also appeal more to app developers 
than many of the existing approaches.  
8.2.3 Patterns of a Different Kind 
As discussed in section 6.2, the format used to describe the Dialectical Security 
techniques is based on the Design Patterns format [46].  The format works particularly 
well because of several aspects: the name makes each item easy to discuss and remember; 
the repeated structure makes them easy to follow (chapter 4 showed that this approach is 
now used by many non-pattern books); and the implied problem-context-solution format 
helps readers to decide whether the technique is appropriate to particularly situations.  
The main difference from the design patterns format is that where patterns gain authority 
from ‘known uses’, these techniques take their authority from the Grounded Theory 
analysis, grounded in existing practice and substantiated by quotations; we believe this 
makes them more compelling than, for example, Schumacher et al.’s ‘security process’ 
patterns [94]. 
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8.3 Experience of Grounded Theory 
The analysis followed the lines outlined in Section 2.5 ‘Grounded Theory Step-by-Step’. 
As a newcomer to Grounded Theory, the author was surprised to find that the approach 
worked opportunistically – in that each new step addressed a problem that he had 
gradually identified in carrying out the earlier steps. So for example, the categorisation 
phase addressed the problem ‘how do we locate existing codes now that we’ve got so 
many?’ Then as he started an initial write-up of one of the conclusions, he encountered a 
new problem ‘the data points us to this conclusion; how, objectively, can we back up or 
reject that conclusion?’ Core Categories addressed that problem. Lastly, in writing up, he 
needed to create a compelling narrative and to justify specific theories that arose from the 
analysis; sorting addressed that problem. 
8.4 Revisiting Objectives 
In the introduction to this thesis we discussed the research question: 
RQ1 What techniques and ideas will appeal to development teams and lead to them 
developing more secure app software? 
That led to three other questions, about how the experts themselves were motivated and 
how they learned; about the most effective techniques to deliver app security; and about 
ways of introducing those techniques to developers and teams. The rest of this section 
looks at each question in turn. 
RQ2 What motivated the experts themselves to learn software security; how did they 
do so; and how do they continue to learn? 
Chapter 5 considered this in some detail. We explored four forces affecting developers’ 
motivation: knowledge, tasks, worry and enthusiasm. Our conclusion was that the 
experts’ own motivations were mainly due to enthusiasm, and they had generally picked 
up their knowledge – and continued to learn – on the job and through hobby work rather 
than through any kind of formal instruction or learning. Our novel finding related to this 
is that most app developers, by contrast with the experts, have little knowledge or even 
interest related to app security. 
RQ3 What are the most effective techniques to deliver app security? 
      97 
Chapter 6 outlined six techniques of ‘Dialectic Security’, which encapsulate aspects of 
good app security practice highlighted by the experts we interviewed. While we do not 
have evidence to state objectively that these are the most effective techniques, we can be 
sure that they are effective techniques, and that our interviewees considered them to be 
amongst the most useful available to them. The novel finding is that these techniques 
relate not to the artefacts produced, nor to formal Secure Development Processes, but 
rather to a culture of encouraging challenges from a variety of counterparties – a culture 
of ‘dialectic’. 
RQ4 How should we effectively introduce security to app development teams? 
Chapter 5 outlines the opinions of the experts interviewed on appropriate ways to 
motivate and teach development teams. These, though, varied very considerably, leading 
us to conclude that the discipline of app development security is at an early stage. We 
shall revisit this question in section 8.8.1, outlining possible approaches and ways to 
evaluate them. 
8.5  Research Validity and Verifiability 
How certain can we be that this theory accurately reflects reality? We approach this 
question by analysing threats to validity. 
Considering first Conclusion Validity, do the research data justify the conclusions? 
Grounded Theory’s rigorous process of line by line coding, categorisation, and sorting 
generates theory that does reflect the interview data. The use of extensive quotations 
ensures that this can be at least partially checked. 
In terms of Construct Validity, does the Dialectical Security theory represent actual 
practice? GT handles this primarily in terms of ‘theoretical saturation’, reached when new 
interviews do not add substantially to the theory. Guest [51] suggests that a dozen 
interviews are often sufficient for this; in this case as researchers we believe we have 
reached theoretical saturation with regard to the list of techniques, but not with regard to 
all the potential detail to be uncovered within each technique.  There is also a risk of bias 
in the choice of interviewees, and of questions; we addressed this with interviewees from 
a wide range of industry roles, and completely open questions [109]. 
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In terms of External Validity, can the results be generalised to a wider scope? GT’s 
conclusions are always limited to the specific scope studied [21].  In this case since many 
of the experts were familiar with – and sometimes describing – more general secure 
software development, some conclusions will apply to non-app development. We can 
however make no claims of applicability to different development cultures other than UK 
and US-based companies. 
Finally we should qualify what validity we are discussing. The interview process has 
determined industry understanding of best practice (community knowledge of ‘truth’); 
this may possibly not correspond to actual best practice (objective ‘truth’). The 
Testability discussion in section 8.5.1 and the research suggested in section 8.7 address 
this limitation. 
8.5.1 Verifiability 
We propose two approaches to verify this theory: 
Repeatability: First, an independent researcher can join the team (hence 
preserving confidentially) to reanalyse the existing transcriptions to validate or challenge 
the Conclusion Validity. Second, we can return to those interviewees who consent, to 
explore aspects of the techniques in more detail. Third, we, or a different research team, 
may repeat the GT-based interviews with a different set of experts to explore if the theory 
derived is consistent with Dialectical Security – or if it extends to different development 
cultures. 
Testability: The theory implies that introducing Dialectical Security techniques will 
improve app security. The authors’ paper ‘Reaching the Masses’ [107] explores 
approaches to introduce such techniques and evaluate whether this improvement does 
happen. 
8.6 Proposals for Future Work 
We have identified two further areas for future work, exploring the research questions 
RQ3 and RQ4 respectively: research to expand knowledge of the Dialectical Security 
techniques; and research to discover ways of introducing them to app developers. The 
next two sections examine them in detail. 
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8.7 Researching Dialectical Security Techniques 
Section 8.1 identified that three of the techniques, Security Challenge, Automated 
Challenge and Responsive Development, are relatively well-understood. Therefore we 
propose that further research examine the three less well understood techniques: 
Brainstorming the Enemy, Negotiated Security and Cross-team Security Discussion. We 
suggest proposed research questions along the lines of  
PRQ1 What are the most effective ways to ideate understanding of attackers and 
potential exploits? 
PRQ2 How best do we represent security questions in business terms? 
PRQ3 What forms of cross-team interaction are most effective to ensure app security? 
There are several possible approaches to this research. Experimental approaches might 
trial a variety of representations of security questions with a number of product managers; 
or set up different groups of Computer Science students with different ideation techniques 
and compare their success at identifying attackers and exploits. An ethnographic 
approach might follow the progress of a development team, identifying where the major 
security mitigations were identified and how the negotiations took place in practice. A 
survey approach, by contrast, might ask the questions of a variety of developers and 
stakeholders to produce a possible consensus. 
8.8 Researching Teaching Interventions  
Section 5.1 identified that few developers are knowledgeable or even motivated to 
improve app security. To improve the situation we need to reach out to a group of 
individuals, without having direct access to them or direct influence on them. We need a 
new paradigm; we need a new way to reach these people. 
8.8.1 A Different Approach 
Different programmers learn in different ways and are interested in different things, so we 
believe a single form of intervention, however effective, is unlikely to reach all of our 
target audience. In addition, since we are in effect teaching new attitudes, few of the 
traditional mechanisms such as books are likely to work.  
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We propose instead ‘engaging’ interventions likely to appeal to programmers for their 
own sake. We anticipate that these will be publicised via the web: expert blogs, and 
security OS websites. 
The following sections explore some possibilities for these interventions. 
8.8.2 Games That Teach 
One popular approach is games. A great deal of work has been done on gamification, 
with books such as Kapp’s [62] explaining the techniques involved. Tillman et al.’s game 
Code Hunt [104] teaches vast numbers of programmers through an online game. Code 
Hunt’s approach is to provide a unit test that the programmer’s code must pass; this 
certainly demonstrates the dialectic aspect, but will not be very good for teaching the 
other security techniques. Other researchers, including the authors, have had success with 
group games to teach aspects of software security, such as Denning et al.’s Control-Alt-
Hack game [34]. These work very well in a classroom or conference context, but do not 
naturally extend to reach to an online audience. 
Instead we suggest solo or multiplayer games suitable for distributed players. Picture 
Angry Birds meeting Stack Overflow! Have players implement security aspects to defend 
against attacks? Perhaps crowd source both attacks and defences, where each player gets 
to both take the role of attacker on other players’ code, and defender on their own. It is an 
enchanting possibility; even if it risks taking too much time to engage the typical target 
solo programmer. 
8.8.3 Story Telling 
A different approach is story-telling. The British radio soap opera, The Archers, has been 
running for 65 years, and has over 5 million regular listeners; its main purpose, at which 
it is highly successful, is to teach farming knowledge to a community that is unreachable 
by any other form of education. Taking a similar approach here would suggest a podcast 
(and blog) narrating a plot that would cover and teach each of these aspects.  
More ambitious would be a storyline in an appropriate existing series (‘Mr. Robot’, and 
the UK’s ‘IT Crowd’ come to mind), to be created if the opportunity arose. 
      101 
A related approach might be through a comic strip already popular with programmers, 
such as the XKCD series [88]; the back archives of such comic strips would give the 
benefit of something permanent, easily accessible and shareable by developers. Zhang-
Kennedy et al. used such an approach with success to teach security in the context of end 
users [117]. 
8.8.4 Adapting Business as Usual Approaches 
More conventional is to tailor direct teaching and group learning approaches to the 
distributed nature of the target audience. This suggests implementing a massively open 
online course (MOOC) on app security using audio, written text, and video along with 
interactive discussion groups. Organisations such as edX and Futurelearn provide 
frameworks to make this straightforward [122,123]. 
Another possibility is a short video along the lines of – or indeed actually – a TED talk by 
a suitable expert.  
Both possibilities leverage the ‘professional skills gaining’ motivation present in 
programmers, which suggests promoting them via professional organisations too. 
8.8.5 Research Agenda 
Whilst each of these interventions has promise, we do not know which are likely to be 
effective, nor which techniques and variants of each will have the most impact. This leads 
us to a set of proposed research questions:  
PRQ4 How best to design and implement the interventions to convey the Dialectical 
Security techniques? This is a complex problem, involving amongst other 
aspects elements of design, gamification and measurement of impact. 
PRQ5 Which interventions – and dissemination techniques – are most effective at 
conveying each technique to the largest population of programmers? 
Implementing all the interventions at scale will be costly; we shall need to 
evaluate which ones offer the most value. 
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PRQ6 Which interventions provoke a wider interest in the programmers reached? To 
achieve a lasting effect we do not just need to engage programmers initially, but 
need also to encourage further interest and learning in the subject. 
This approach is very different from others in the field of programmer education, making 
this an entirely new subdiscipline. The research will require a multi-disciplinary team, 
with varying skills, including at least the following: 
Programming: To implement code based interventions such as games. 
Psychology: To achieve the ‘attractiveness’ of the content; to structure 
measurement of the results; to use psychological techniques to ‘nudge’ 
programmers towards more effective security practices. 
Creative 
writing: 
For the storyline. 
Narration: For an engaging verbal version of the storyline. 
Marketing: To establish and develop the channels to bring the content to the target 
audience. 
8.8.6 Evaluating Techniques 
The research will require objective measurement. In particular we can identify four 
aspects to measure: 
Success Using the interventions with a sample group of students or similar, 
and evaluating their learning based on the intervention (PRQ4). 
Reach The number of downloads, accesses, or to the resource (PRQ5) 
Engagement The number of accesses of later parts of the resource. (PRQ5) 
Coverage Attending exhibitions such as Apps World frequented by the target 
solo programmer audience and asking via a simple questionnaire 
of delegates which if any of the interventions they have 
encountered and their impact (PRQ5 PRQ6). 
      103 
Ideally we shall want to extend our research to measure outcomes as well as these 
outputs. Whilst we can argue that the combination of ‘success’ with ‘engagement’ and 
‘coverage’ implies a positive impact, better still would be evidence of an improvement in 
the code produced by programmers in the target group.  
To achieve that, we might collect app identifiers, where possible, from participants for a 
‘before and after’ anonymous evaluation of their released apps’ security along the lines of 
that by Enck et al. [39]. Other possibilities would include extending the questionnaires in 
the ‘coverage’ evaluation to estimate interviewees’ awareness of app security, and 
correlating that with exposure to the interventions. 
8.9 Conclusion 
To summarise, in this Grounded Theory study using interviews of experts in secure app 
development, we encountered three particular surprises. First was a clear indication that 
the discipline of app security is at a very early stage of development. Second was a 
significant discrepancy between current industry understanding of the approach required 
by app developers, and the experts’ recommendations of good practice. Finally we found 
that some of the best techniques for software security were not in terms of artefacts and 
reports, nor formal processes, but a culture in the developers themselves. 
The study generated a theory of ‘Dialectic Security’, continuing challenging dialogue 
with different counterparties; chapter 6 explores six techniques within this theory. We 
conclude that these techniques are well-suited for app development teams in the majority 
of organisations. We can investigate the techniques further as discussed in section 8.7; we 
can also look for ways to disseminate them more widely, and research interventions as 
discussed in section 8.8 to introduce them into a range of existing development teams. 
Using these techniques, we believe, will enhance the future security of apps, and lead to 
better safety for all of those who use them. 
 
      104 
References 
[1] Acar, Y., Backes, M., Bugiel, S., Fahl, S., Mcdaniel, P.D., and Smith, M. SoK: 
Lessons Learned from Android Security Research for Appified Software 
Platforms. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2016, San Jose, CA, 
USA, May 22-26, 2016, (2016), 433–451. 
[2] Acar, Y., Backes, M., Fahl, S., Kim, D., Mazurek, M.L., and Stransky, C. You 
Get Where You’re Looking For. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
(2016), 289–305. 
[3] Adolph, S., Hall, W., and Kruchten, P. Using Grounded Theory to Study the 
Experience of Software Development. Empirical Software Engineering 16, 4 
(2011), 487–513. 
[4] Akerlof, G.A. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 3 (1970), 488–500. 
[5] Alexander, C. The Timeless Way of Building. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979. 
[6] Allan, G. A Critique of Using Grounded Theory as a Research Method. The 
Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods 2, 1 (2003), 1–10. 
[7] Anderson, R. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable 
Distributed Systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2008. 
      105 
[8] Apple. Introduction to Secure Coding Guide. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Se
cureCodingGuide/Introduction.html. 
[9] Ashenden, D. and Lawrence, D. Security Dialogues : Building Better 
Relationships. IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, June (2016). 
[10] Balebako, R., Marsh, A., Lin, J., Hong, J., and Cranor, L. The Privacy and 
Security Behaviors of Smartphone App Developers. Internet Society, October 
(2014). 
[11] Banks, A. and Edge, C.S. Learning iOS Security. Packt Publishing, 
Birmingham, UK, 2015. 
[12] Barua, A., Thomas, S.W., and Hassan, A.E. What Are Developers Talking 
about? An Analysis of Topics and Trends in Stack Overflow. 2012. 
[13] Baum, T., Liskin, O., Niklas, K., and Schneider, K. Factors Influencing Code 
Review Processes in Industry. FSE2016, (2016). 
[14] Beck, K. and Fowler, M. Planning Extreme Programming. Addison-Wesley 
Professional, 2001. 
[15] Beecham, S., Baddoo, N., and Hall, T. Motivation in Software Engineering : A 
Systematic Literature Review. Information and Software Technology 50, 9 
(2008), 860–878. 
[16] Bejtlich, R. Reviews of Six Software Security Books. 2006. 
http://taosecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2006/11/reviews-of-six-software-security-
books.html. 
[17] Blackwell, C. and Zhu, H. Cyberpatterns. Springer, Heidelberg New York 
Dordrecht London, 2014. 
[18] Bluebox Security.  ’Tis the Season to Risk Mobile App Payments - An 
Evaluation of Top Payment Apps. 2015. 
[19] Bruce Schneier. Schneier on Security: Crypto-Gram. 
      106 
https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/. 
[20] Carmel, E. Global Software Teams: Collaborating across Borders and Time 
Zones. Prentice Hall PTR, 1999. 
[21] Charmaz, K. Constructing Grounded Theory. Sage, London, 2014. 
[22] Chell, D., Erasmus, T., Colley, S., and Whitehouse, O. The Mobile Application 
Hacker’s Handbook. John Wiley & Sons, Indianapolis, 2015. 
[23] Chevalier, J. and Goolsbee, A. Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: 
Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com. Quantitative Marketing and 
Economics 1, 2 (2003), 203–222. 
[24] Clarke, S. What Is an End User Software Engineer? Dagstuhl Seminar 
Proceedings (07081 - End-User Software Engineering), (2007), 1–2. 
[25] Cockburn, A. and Williams, L. The Costs and Benefits of Pair Programming. In 
Extreme Programming Examined. 2001, 223–243. 
[26] Conradi, R. and Dybå, T. An Empirical Study on the Utility of Formal Routines 
to Transfer Knowledge and Experience. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering 
Notes 26, 5 (2001), 268–276. 
[27] Cooperrider, D.L. and Whitney, D. Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Revolution 
in Change. Appreciative Inquiry, (2005), 30. 
[28] Cooperrider, D.L., Whitney, D.K., and Stavros, J.M. Appreciative Inquiry 
Handbook. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2003. 
[29] Cravens, A. A Demographic and Business Model Analysis of Today’s App 
Developer. GigaOM Pro, September, (2012). 
[30] Creswell, J.W. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. Sage publications, 2013. 
[31] Dai Zovi, D.A. Apple iOS 4 Security Evaluation. BlackHat USA, 2011. 
http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-
11/DaiZovi/BH_US_11_DaiZovi_iOS_Security_WP.pdf. 
      107 
[32] Dashti, M.T. and Basin, D. Security Testing Beyond Functional Tests. 
Engineering Secure Software and Systems, Springer (2016), 1–19. 
[33] DeMarco, T. and Lister, T. Peopleware: Productive Projects and Teams. 
Addison-Wesley, NJ, 2013. 
[34] Denning, T., Lerner, A., Shostack, A., and Kohno, T. Control-Alt-Hack: The 
Design and Evaluation of a Card Game for Computer Security Awareness and 
Education. CCS ’13: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on 
Computer & Communications Security, (2013), 915–928. 
[35] Drake, J.J., Lanier, Z., Mulliner, C., Fora, P.O., Ridley, S.A., and Wicherski, G. 
Android Hacker’s Handbook. John Wiley & Sons, Indianapolis, 2014. 
[36] Dybå, T. An Empirical Investigation of the Key Factors for Success in Software 
Process Improvement. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 31, 5 
(2005), 410–424. 
[37] Egele, M., Brumley, D., Fratantonio, Y., and Kruegel, C. An Empirical Study 
of Cryptographic Misuse in Android Applications. Proceedings of the 2013 
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security - CCS 
’13, (2013), 73–84. 
[38] Elenkov, N. Android Security Internals: An In-Depth Guide to Android’s 
Security Architecture. No Starch Press, San Francisco, 2014. 
[39] Enck, W., Octeau, D., McDaniel, P., and Chaudhuri, S. A Study of Android 
Application Security. Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Conference on Security, 
(2011). 
[40] Enes, P. and Conradi, R. Acquiring and Sharing Expert Knowledge. 2005. 
http://www.idi.ntnu.no/grupper/su/fordypningsprosjekt-2005/aanes-
fordyp05.pdf. 
[41] Enisa. Smartphone Secure Development Guidelines for App Developers. Enisa, 
(2011), 17. 
[42] Fahl, S., Harbach, M., Muders, T., Smith, M., Baumgärtner, L., and Freisleben, 
      108 
B. Why Eve and Mallory Love Android : An Analysis of Android SSL Security 
Categories and Subject Descriptors. Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security - CCS ’12, ACM Press (2012). 
[43] Faily, S. and Flechais, I. Persona Cases: A Technique for Grounding Personas. 
Chi 2011, (2011), 2267–2270. 
[44] Fisher, R., Ury, W.L., and Patton, B. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In. Penguin, 2011. 
[45] Furniss, D., Blandford, A.A., and Curzon, P. Confessions from a Grounded 
Theory PhD: Experiences and Lesson Learnt. Proceedings of the 2011 Annual 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’11, (2011), 113. 
[46] Gamma, E., Helm, R., Johnson, R., and Vlissides, J. Design Patterns: Elements 
of Reusable Object-Oriented Software. Pearson Education, 1994. 
[47] Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. The Discovery of Grounded Theory : Strategies 
for Qualitative Research. Aldine Transaction, Chicago, 1973. 
[48] Glaser, B.G. Theoretical Sensitivity. Sociology Press, 1978. 
[49] Gollmann, D. Computer Security. Chichester : Wiley, 2011. 
[50] Google. Android Security Tips. 
http://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-tips.html. 
[51] Guest, G., Bunce, A., and Johnson, L. How Many Interviews Are Enough? An 
Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability. Field Methods 18, 1 (2006), 
59–82. 
[52] Hafiz, M., Adamczyk, P., and Johnson, R.E. Growing a Pattern Language (for 
Security). Proceedings of the ACM International Symposium on New Ideas, 
New Paradigms, and Reflections on Programming and Software - Onward! 
’12, (2012), 139. 
[53] Hoda, R., Noble, J., and Marshall, S. Organizing Self-Organizing Teams. 
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software 
      109 
Engineering (ICSE ’10) - Volume 1, (2010), 285–294. 
[54] Hoda, R., Noble, J., and Marshall, S. Grounded Theory for Geeks. Conference 
on Pattern Languages of Programs, ACM (2011), 1–17. 
[55] Howard, M., LeBlanc, D., and Viega, J. 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security: 
Programming Flaws and How to Fix Them. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 2009. 
[56] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 21827:2008 - Systems Security Engineering - Capability 
Maturity Model. 2008, (2008), 144. 
[57] Jackson, M., Crouch, S., and Baxter, R. Software Evaluation: Criteria-Based 
Assessment. Software Sustainability Institute, …, (2011), 1–13. 
[58] Johnson, B., Song, Y., Murphy-Hill, E., and Bowdidge, R. Why Don’t Software 
Developers Use Static Analysis Tools to Find Bugs? 2013 35th International 
Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), IEEE (2013), 672–681. 
[59] Johnson, M. and Senges, M. Learning to Be a Programmer in a Complex 
Organization. Journal of Workplace Learning 22, 3 (2010), 180–194. 
[60] Judge, S. Android App Security. http://www.androidsecurity.guru. 
[61] Judge, S. Private Communication. 2016. 
[62] Kapp, K.M. The Gamification of Learning and Instruction: Game-Based 
Methods and Strategies for Training and Education. John Wiley & Sons, San 
Francisco, 2012. 
[63] Kienzle, D.M., Elder, M.C., Tyree, D., and Edwards-Hewitt, J. Security 
Patterns Repository Version 1.0. DARPA, Washington DC, (2002). 
[64] Komatineni, S. and MacLean, D. Pro Android 4. Apress, 2012. 
[65] Lerch, J., Hermann, B., Bodden, E., and Mezini, M. FlowTwist: Efficient 
Context-Sensitive Inside-out Taint Analysis for Large Codebases. Proceedings 
of the 22nd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of 
Software Engineering, (2014), 98–108. 
      110 
[66] LLVM Project. libFuzzer. http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html. 
[67] Makan, K. and Alexander-Bown, S. Android Security Cookbook. Packt 
Publishing Ltd, 2013. 
[68] McGraw, G. Software Security: Building Security In. Addison-Wesley 
Professional, 2006. 
[69] Microsoft. Microsoft Secure Development Lifecycle. 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/. 
[70] Microsoft. Learning Security - MSDN. https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/security/aa570420.aspx. 
[71] Munawar Hafiz. Security Pattern Catalog. 
http://www.munawarhafiz.com/securitypatterncatalog/index.php. 
[72] Murphy-Hill, E., Lee, D.Y., Murphy, G.C., and McGrenere, J. How Do Users 
Discover New Tools in Software Development and Beyond? Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) 24, 5 (2015), 389–422. 
[73] Myers, G.J., Sandler, C., and Badgett, T. The Art of Software Testing. John 
Wiley & Sons, 2011. 
[74] Nadi, S., Krüger, S., Mezini, M., and Bodden, E. Jumping Through Hoops : 
Why Do Java Developers Struggle With Cryptography APIs ? ICSE16: 38th 
IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering, (2015). 
[75] Naqvi, S.A.A. The Grounded Incident Fault Theories ( GIFTs ) Method. 2014. 
[76] Near, J.P. and Jackson, D. Finding Security Bugs in Web Applications Using a 
Catalog of Access Control Patterns. Proceedings of the 38th International 
Conference on Software Engineering, ACM (2016), 947–958. 
[77] Nguyen, D., Acar, Y., and Backes, M. Developers Are Users Too : Helping 
Developers Write Privacy Preserving and Secure ( Android ) Code. 2016. 
[78] Noble, J. and Weir, C. Small Memory Software: Patterns for Systems with 
Limited Memory. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., Boston, MA, 
      111 
USA, 2001. 
[79] Oates, B.J. Researching Information Systems and Computing. 2006. 
[80] Ben Othmane, L., Ranchal, R., Fernando, R., Bhargava, B., and Bodden, E. 
Incorporating Attacker Capabilities in Risk Estimation and Mitigation. 
Computers & Security 51, (2015), 41–61. 
[81] OWASP Foundation. OWASP Code Review Guide Book. OWASP Foundation, 
2008. 
[82] Pfleeger, C.P. and Pfleeger, S.L. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall 
Professional Technical Reference, 2002. 
[83] Pirsig, R.M. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into 
Values. Random House, 1999. 
[84] Ponemon Institute. The State of Mobile Application Insecurity. 2015. 
[85] Proksch, S., Bauer, V., and Murphy, G.C. How to Build a Recommendation 
System for Software Engineering. In Software Engineering - International 
Summer Schools, LASER 2013-2014, Elba, Italy, Revised Tutorial Lectures. 
2014, 1–42. 
[86] Pruit, J. and Grudin, J. Personas: Practice and Theory. Proceedings of the 2003 
Conference on Designing for User Experiences, ACM (2003), 1–15. 
[87] Quora. How Frequently Do Users Actually Update Their iOS Apps? 
https://www.quora.com/How-frequently-do-users-actually-update-their-iOS-
apps. 
[88] Randall Munroe. XKCD: A Webcomic of Romance, Sarcasm, Math and 
Language. http://xkcd.com/. 
[89] Reed, J. Appreciative Inquiry: Research for Change. Sage, 2006. 
[90] Rigby, P.C. and Bird, C. Convergent Contemporary Software Peer Review 
Practices. Proceedings of the 2013 9th Joint Meeting on Foundations of 
Software Engineering - ESEC/FSE 2013, (2013), 202. 
      112 
[91] Romanosky, S. Security Design Patterns Part 1. Proceedings of PLoP, (2001), 
1–19. 
[92] SANS Institute. SANS Institute Security Resources. 
https://www.sans.org/security-resources/. 
[93] Schneier, B. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. John 
Wiley & Sons, 2011. 
[94] Schumacher, M., Fernandez-buglioni, E., Hybertson, D., Buschmann, F., and 
Sommerlad, P. Security Patterns: Integrating Security and Systems 
Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, 2005. 
[95] Shih, Patrick C. and Venolia, Gina and Olson, G.M. Brainstorming Under 
Constraints: Why Software Developers Brainstorm in Gro Ups. Proceedings of 
the 25th BCS Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, (2011), 74–83. 
[96] Six, J. Application Security for the Android Platform. O’Reilly, Sebastapol, 
CA, 2011. 
[97] SonarSource SA. Sonar Code Inspection. http://www.sonarqube.org. 
[98] Steel, C., Nagappan, R., and Lai, R. Core Security Patterns. Prentice Hall, 
2006. 
[99] Sterling, G.D. and Brinthaupt, T.M. Faculty and Industry Conceptions of 
Successful Computer Programmers. Journal of Information Systems Education 
14, 4 (2003), 417. 
[100] Stol, K., Ralph, P., and Fitzgerald, B. Grounded Theory in Software 
Engineering Research : A Critical Review and Guidelines. Proceedings of the 
38th International Conference on Software Engineering, ACM (2015), 120–
131. 
[101] Strauss, A.L. and Corbin, J.M. Basics of Qualitative Research. Sage Newbury 
Park, CA, 1990. 
[102] The Allium. Computer Programming To Be Officially Renamed “Googling 
      113 
Stackoverflow.” http://www.theallium.com/engineering/computer-
programming-to-be-officially-renamed-googling-stackoverflow/. 
[103] Thomas, D., Beresford, A., and Rice, A. Security Metrics for the Android 
Ecosystem. Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM CCS Workshop on Security 
and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices, (2015), 87–98. 
[104] Tillmann, N., de Halleux, J., Xie, T., and Bishop, J. Code Hunt: Gamifying 
Teaching and Learning of Computer Science at Scale. Proceedings of the First 
ACM Conference on Learning@ Scale Conference, ACM (2014), 221–222. 
[105] Vidas, T., Cylab, E.C.E., Votipka, D., Cylab, I.N.I., and Christin, N. All Your 
Droid Are Belong to Us: A Survey of Current Android Attacks. WOOT, (2011), 
81–90. 
[106] Vision Mobile. Developer Economics Q3 2014: State of the Developer Nation. 
London, 2014. 
[107] Weir, C., Rashid, A., and Noble, J. Reaching the Masses: A New Subdiscipline 
of App Programmer Education. FSE’16: 24nd ACM SIGSOFT International 
Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering Proceedings: Visions 
and Reflections, ACM (2016). 
[108] Weir, C. Penrillian’s Secure Development Process. 2013. 
http://www.penrillian.com/sites/default/files/documents/Secure_Development_
Process.pdf. 
[109] Weir, C. How to Improve the Security Skills of Mobile App Developers: 
Comparing and Contrasting Expert Views. 2016. 
[110] Wikipedia. Dialectic. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic. 
[111] Xie, J., Chu, B., Lipford, H.R., and Melton, J.T. ASIDE: IDE Support for Web 
Application Security. Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference on - ACSAC ’11, (2011), 267. 
[112] Xie, J., Lipford, H.R., and Chu, B. Why Do Programmers Make Security 
Errors? Proceedings - 2011 IEEE Symposium on Visual Languages and Human 
      114 
Centric Computing, VL/HCC 2011, (2011), 161–164. 
[113] Yoder, J. and Barcalow, J. Architectural Patterns for Enabling Application 
Security. Proceedings of PLoP 1997, (1998), 31. 
[114] Yskout, K., Heyman, T., Scandariato, R., and Joosen, W. A System of Security 
Patterns. Heverlee, 2006. 
[115] Yskout, K., Heyman, T., Scandariato, R., and Joosen, W. Security Patterns: 10 
Years Later. Heverlee, 2008. 
[116] Yskout, K., Scandariato, R., and Joosen, W. Do Security Patterns Really Help 
Designers? 2015 IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE International Conference on Software 
Engineering, IEEE (2015), 292–302. 
[117] Zhang-Kennedy, L., Chiasson, S., and Biddle, R. The Role of Instructional 
Design in Persuasion: A Comics Approach for Improving Cybersecurity. 
International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction 32, 3 (2016), 215–257. 
[118] Stack Overflow Developer Survey 2016 Results. 
http://stackoverflow.com/research/developer-survey-2016#developer-profile. 
[119] OWASP Developer Guide. https://github.com/OWASP/DevGuide. 
[120] OWASP Mobile Security Project - Top Ten Mobile Risks. 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Projects/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project_
-_Top_Ten_Mobile_Risks. 
[121] William Brandon - Private Communication. . 
[122] edX. https://www.edx.org. 
[123] Futurelearn. https://www.futurelearn.com. 
      115 
Appendices 
      116 
Diagram of Key Codings 
The following diagram shows a subset of the GT codings from the interviews, arranged to 
show the relative frequency of coding. This represents a ‘sorted’ set of codes – merged 
and recreated from the original coding. The full names of the codes are given in the 
following section. 
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Table of Key Codes 
The table below shows key Grounded Theory codes, along with the number of interviews 
in which they were found (Srcs) and the number of times each was referenced within 
those interviews (Refs). 
Codes Srcs Refs 
Concepts 0 0 
Active deterrence 4 18 
Honeypots 2 5 
Using redundancy 3 8 
App implications 0 0 
- Can spoof 2 2 
App processing and storage benefit 4 6 
App store vetting 3 4 
Biometrics 2 2 
Cryptography issues in offline apps 1 5 
Difficult feedback 2 3 
Insecure infrastructure 5 13 
Internet of Things 2 4 
Issues of battery life 1 1 
OS Permission Models 4 11 
Physical access to device 2 7 
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Codes Srcs Refs 
Privacy 1 1 
Secure install channel 3 5 
Upgrading issues 6 9 
Architecture policies 4 6 
Automation 1 1 
Awareness of security 3 10 
Deep learning 1 1 
Augmented analysis 1 2 
Augmented attacks 1 3 
Augmented code review 2 3 
Augmented test generation 2 2 
Development team structure and working 5 11 
Agile 2 4 
Analyse system and changes 6 9 
Interaction with other teams 3 10 
Interaction with product owners 7 24 
Keeping list of discovered exploits 1 1 
Mistakes and errors 1 1 
Right to query 3 4 
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Codes Srcs Refs 
Standard development environments 1 4 
Trade-off between security and cost 9 17 
Dialectic 1 1 
Automatic code review tools 4 8 
Interaction amongst development team 3 10 
Penetration and other testing 8 20 
Reviews 5 15 
Verification 1 1 
Fundamental principles of software security 3 4 
Openness 2 9 
- Defensiveness 1 5 
- Silos 2 6 
- Time pressures 1 3 
Co-location 1 5 
Curiosity 1 2 
Informal communication 1 2 
Open source 6 10 
Shared understanding 1 1 
Social interaction 1 4 
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Codes Srcs Refs 
Planning for future security 4 6 
Secure by default 2 4 
Security state machine 3 7 
Step-by-step 4 5 
Teaching and learning 2 4 
Tick box security 8 27 
- Complacency 2 3 
- Discourages innovation 2 5 
- Discourages updating 1 2 
- Legalistic arguments 2 6 
- Out of date 1 2 
Google five privacy principles 1 1 
Using cryptography 4 4 
Whole system security 6 9 
- Security as an add-on 1 2 
Attacker profiling 6 17 
Choice of tools environments components and protocols 10 17 
Continuous upgrading 9 20 
Exploit and threat analysis 10 16 
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Codes Srcs Refs 
Humans as part of system 6 20 
No absolute security 5 9 
Prevent access 7 9 
Requirements vs specification 2 3 
Security budget 3 3 
 
